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Chapter 1
Introduction
The health system and the financing is one of the main economic and social problems
of our time. Over the past years we have seen dramatic changes in treatment of dis-
eases through new innovations in health sciences. The OECD Health Data 2011 from
June 2011 provides comparable statistics on health and health systems across OECD
countries. Table 1.1 shows the increase of total expenditures in health as percentage
of the gross domestical product from 1960 to 2010. for a selected sample of 16 OECD
countries. For Austria as an example we observe an increase in total expenditures from
4.3% in 1960 to 11% in 20091.
Besides several other reasons like demographic change the expenditures on pharma-
ceutical research and development increased in the last two decades dramatically which
had a direct effect on the percentage of GDP spent on health care. We will point out in
the ongoing chapters on pharmaceutical R&D reasons for the increase. This increase in
expenditures and the overuse of pharmaceuticals in OECD countries led to an increase
in spendings on pharmaceuticals within the last 50 years which can be seen in Table 1.2.
For this reason a discussion about the health care system and the health care costs has
to consider these rising expenditures in pharmaceuticals. An important role plays the
private industry and the patenting system which allows a monopoly market situation
for a certain time.
In this thesis we want to take a closer look at the expenditures of pharmaceutical
1Note that for the year 2010 no data for Austria is available.
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Table 1.1: Total expenditure on health, % gross domestic product (OECD (2011))
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009 2010
Austria 4.3 5.2 7.4 8.3 9.9 11.0
Canada 5.4 6.9 7.0 8.9 8.8 11.4 11.3
Finland 3.8 5.5 6.3 7.7 7.2 9.2 8.9
France 3.8 5.4 7.0 8.4 10.1 11.8
Germany 6.0 8.4 8.3 10.3 11.6
Iceland 3.0 4.7 6.3 7.8 9.5 9.7 9.3
Ireland 3.7 5.1 8.2 6.1 6.1 9.5
Japan 3.0 4.5 6.4 5.9 7.7
Luxembourg 3.1 5.2 5.4 7.5 7.8
New Zealand 5.2 5.8 6.8 7.6 10.3
Norway 2.9 4.4 7.0 7.6 8.4 9.6
Spain 1.5 3.5 5.3 6.5 7.2 9.5
Sweden 6.8 8.9 8.2 8.2 10.0
Switzerland 4.9 5.5 7.4 8.2 10.2 11.4 11.6
United Kingdom 3.9 4.5 5.6 5.9 7.0 9.8
United States 5.1 7.1 9.0 12.4 13.7 17.4
companies and present methods to validate research and development costs. The in-
vestment in R&D in the pharmaceutical industry is not comparable to other industries
due to several reasons. Pharmaceutical companies have to invest a huge amount in an
uncertain investment with no cash flows for a long time. A target molecule which is
examined in labratory studies to have a certain effect on a target within a disease is
patented right after the labratory research. To enter the market the drug has to be
authorized which requires the drug to pass three different stages of clinical trials. This
time of clinical trials requires huge investments without any cash flows.
All these facts have to be taken into account when analyzing the value of such an in-
vestment. The case of GlaxoSmithKline investing in a cooperation with the Austrian
biotech company Apeiron is then taken to validate our models regarding the calculation
of a project value.

Table 1.2: Total expenditure on pharmaceuticals and other medical non-durables, %
total expenditure on health (OECD (2011))
Country 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2009
Austria 9,9 12,3 12,5
Canada 12,9 11,3 8,5 11,5 15,9 17
Finland 17,1 12,6 10,7 9,4 15,2 14,3
France 23,5 23,8 16 16,9 16,5 16,1
Germany 16,2 13,4 14,3 13,6 14,9
Iceland 18,5 17,1 15,9 13,5 14,5 15,7
Ireland 11 12,2 14,1 17,5
Japan 21,2 21,4 18,4
Luxembourg 19,7 14,5 14,9 9,1
New Zealand 11,9 13,8 9,2
Norway 7,8 8,7 7,2 9,5 7,3
Spain 21 17,8 21,3 18,9
Sweden 6,6 6,5 8 13,8 12,5
Switzerland 10,2 10,8 10,1
United Kingdom 14,7 12,8 13,5 14,2
United States 16,1 12,1 8,7 8,8 11,3 12
The evaluation of pharmaceutical research and development projects in the future is
a crucial thing which is directly related to prices. If the percentage of failed R&D at-
tempts increases due to wrong evaluation at first the sucessful R&D projects or in other
words the drugs that enter the market have to make up the loss. Therefore a better eval-
uaton technique as a decision making instrument wouldn’t only help the pharmaceutical
company to decide between different projects but would also in the best case lower the
prices charged on drugs and by doing that the expenditures on pharmaceuticals.
The pharmaceutical R&D process differs substantially from R&D processes in other
industries due to length and uncertainty. Therefore evaluating these investments is

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quite complicated and the most commonly used net present value analysis shows a lot
of weaknesses concerning managerial flexibility which has to be included in the analysis.
For this reason the aim of this thesis was to formulate, implement and test new models
for evaluating pharmaceutical research and development which are based on the real
options approach. Based on the case of a milestone payment agreement between Glax-
oSmithKline and Apeiron we implemented the single-stage Least Squares Monte Carlo
model by Schwartz (2004) and tested it on real world data.
Compared to the implementation by Schwartz (2004) who implemented his model in
Fortran our single-stage model was implemented in MATLAB, which decreased the run-
ning time as far as we know substantially.
Furthermore we present in this thesis a new multi-stage model proposed as an extension
by Schwartz (2004) in his Appendix which was not implemented and tested so far. The
multi-stage model takes into account all four different research and development stages
separately by using different durations, costs and probabilities of failure. We imple-
mented the multi-stage model again in MATLAB using the same real data as for the
single-stage model. We will present a comparison of the results of the two models and
describe the usage of our new multi-stage model as a decision making instrument for
pharmaceutical research an development investments.
This thesis is structured as follows. The first chapter gives an overview over real options
theory starting with general option theory and describing different methods for calcu-
lating project values. The second chapter gives a literature overview and discussion on
the estimation of research and development costs. We use results provided by various
studies of DiMasi et al. (1991, 1995); DiMasi (2000, 2001); DiMasi et al. (2003) and
compare them to the results from Public Citizen (2001). This is especially interesting
since Public Citizen (2001) criticizes DiMasi and the Tuft Center. We will present the
data used, the methodology and the results of both and afterwards review the main ideas
and especially the data and methodology used. The describition of the general process
of drug development is needed to understand how costs accrue in the R&D phase.

Chapter three describes the Monte Carlo simulation and the least squares estimation in
general and develops the Least Squares Monte Carlo model for the single stage process
following Schwartz (2004). Furthermore we try to give explanations why we have chosen
the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation over other real option approaches and why
the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation delivers better results than the net present
value analysis which is most commonly used by companies.
Before the results will be presented the input parameters are discussed in chapter four
by presenting the business profile of GlaxoSmithKline and in detail discuss the case of
GlaxoSmithKline and Apeiron. Chapter 5 then combines the last two chapters by using
the input data out of the case of GSK Austria and Apeiron and the single-stage model
presented in chapter three.


Chapter 2
Real Options
2.1 Introduction
The term real option was used first in 1977 by Stewart Myers in his paper Determinants
of Coporate Borrowing. The term referred to the option pricing theory we will present
in the next section and discussed the application of option pricing for the valuation of
non-financial investments which Stewart Myers called ’real’. These investments include
according to Myers (1977) learning mechanisms and managerial flexibility such as the
multi-stage pharmaceutical research development process we will discuss in this thesis.
The most common approach to value research and development projects is the net
present value approach (NPV), which basically discounts the expected cash flows at a
certain discount rate which is chosen as to reflect the riskiness of a project (Newton
et al. (2004))1. A limitation of the assumption of a discount rate reflecting the riskiness
of a project is the acceptance of managerial inflexibility within the project (Copeland
and Antikarov (2005), Newton et al. (2004)). We can therefore say according to Ross
(1995) by including uncertainty and irreversibility in our analysis, the NPV rule is often
wrong and option theory delivers better results.
Let us assume that the investment on a project lasts for 5 years and cash flows are
realized as soon as investments are finished and research and development reached the
1We will present in Chapter Results a NPV analysis based on our case to compare it to our Least
Squares Monte Carlo Simulation.
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target of entering the market with a new product. The net present value approach does
not include the option to abandon the investement after a certain time period, therefore
it assumes according to Copeland and Antikarov (2005) that the project will proceed
as planned, regardless what happens in the future. Under some circumstances these
assumption can make sense and deliver valuable results, but since we are focusing on
pharmaceutical research and development a better method to valuate project has to be
found. We will go in to further detail in the next chapter by examining the costs and
risks of pharmaceutical development.
An option exists whenever a decision maker or manager has the right, but not the
obligation to perform a certain act . As for financial options, the holder of an option
is given the right but again not the obligation to buy or sell a financial asset at a con-
tracted price. The real option approach by Myers (1977) extends this approach to the
situation where firms have similar rights with regard to real or non-financial assets. The
real option approach works if two things happen: uncertainty concerning future cash
flows and flexibility of the management to respond to this uncertainty.
Since the most influential early works of Myers (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984) and
Kester (1984) two streams of research have emerged: investment decision and their eco-
nomic performance implications.
Option pricing offers on the other side a way to include managerial flexibility in the
validation of a project. Therefore we want to present in the ongoing sections the real
option approach which developed from the mathematical options approaches by Black
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). These works inspired a rapid development on
option pricing methods and will be therefore discussed in the next section.

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2.2 Option Pricing
As mentioned before Black-Scholes modell proposed in 1973 by Fisher Black, Myron
Scholes and Robert Merton is regarded as the breakthrough in mathematical option
pricing2 Following Black and Scholes (1973) there are six factors affecting the prices of
a option. These factors are presented in the Black-Scholes formula used to calculate the
value of an European option using the risk neutrality assumption.
C = S0N(d1)−Ke−rTN(d2) (2.1)
where
d1 =
ln(S0/K) + (r + σ
2/2)T
σ
√
T
d2 = d1 − σ
√
T
In the Black Scholes formula N(d) is the cumulative normal probability density func-
tion, S0 is the current stock price, K the strike price, T the time to expiration, σ standard
deviation period (concerning the rate of return on stock) and r the risk free rate. The
dividends expected during the life of the option are named as di.
Samuelson (1965) modeled an underlying stock price wih an expected return of α and
discounted option values at exercise back to the pricing date with some rate β. The
Black-Scholes formula follows these assumptions but with out taking into account α and
β. Cox et al. (1979) therefore concluded that as long as the parameters α and β reflect
the same risk aversion there is no effect on the option price. Considering an investor
which is risk neutral, he would discount all cash flows at a risk free rate and therefore
α and β would be both equal to the risk free rate. This is approach is known as the
risk neutral approach to option pricing which we will discuss in further section since it
2Black, Scholes and Merton worked together on the modell. Fisher Black and Myron Scholes published
together The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities whereas Robert Merton published Theory
of Rational Option Pricing. Myron Scholes and Robert Merton were received in 1997 the Nobel Prize
in Economics. Fisher Black died in 1995.
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opened the door to new option valuation techniques as the Monte Carlo method.
Following Hull (2009) there are several generalization to the Black-Scholes model which
are useful for the further mathematical option pricing methods. Black and Scholes
(1973) assume that the stock price follows a Geometric Brownian Motion with a con-
stant volatility, which can be described as a measure of how much a stock is expected
to move in the short-run. For the next important assumption we have to differentiate
between European-style options and American-style options.
European-style options may be exercised only at a single time point in time or in other
words may be only exercised at the expiry date of the option. American-style options on
the other hand may be exercised at any point in time before the expiration of the option.
The Black-Scholes model assumes European-style options. American-style options are
more valuable than European-Style options due the higher managerial flexibility. Ac-
cording to Hull (2009) it can also be assumed that there are no dividends out of the
option during the life of the derivate and that the risk free rate of interest, r, is constant
and the same for all maturities. Furthermore it is assumed that there are no transaction
costs or taxes due to the option.
As the Black-Scholes formula assumes that there are no dividends paid during its life
following Copeland and Antikarov (2005) this is one of the main reasons why the Black-
Scholes formula can’t be used for real-options valuation. The other porblem with using
the Black-Scholes formula for real option valuation is the fact that a real option can be
seen like an American-style option whereas the Black-Scholes formula is has as a strong
assumption European-style options (Copeland and Antikarov (2005)).
For this reason we have to take a deeper look at the definition of real options, different
methods to valuate real options and other valuation techniques. Before that a general
overview on options shall be given in the next section.
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2.3 Put and Call Options
2.3.1 Call Options
A call option is a financial contract between two parties, the buyer and the seller of a
option, which allows the buyer or investor to speculate in stocks that he doesn’t own.
The call option gives the holder the right, but not the obiligation to buy the underlying
asset by a certain date for a certain price (De Weert (2006)). In the graphical illustration
we see the strike price which is defined as the price at which the option can be exercised.
For stock and index options these strike prices are commonly fixed in the contract.
Assuming a hypothetical profit, if the price of the underlying instrument lies below the
strike price, the option is called out of money. On the other hand if the underlying
exceeds the strike price it is called in the money and at the money for a strike price
equal to the underlying.
Option Price 
Strike Price Share Price at  
Maturity 
Payoff Line 
Profit Line 
0 
Figure 2.1: Payoff of a European Call option
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If we don’t take into account transaction costs the ’at the money point’ can be seen as
the break-even point. For in the money options we can think of an example considering
a call option with a strike price e 5.80 and a underlying with a trade value of e 6.20. If
the option holder excercises now his option he is in the money with e 0.40, which means
he excercised his option e 0.40 cheaper than the market price. The opposite is true for
the out of the money options. These are options which will not produce a profit if it is
exercised. Considering again an example if an option holder contracted at a strike price
of e 6.00 and the trade value now is e 4.00 he would be out of money with e 2.00 which
means that he wouldn’t excercise the option since he can buy the stock for e 4.00 at the
market. Summarized this means if you would excercise the option right now you would
be ’out of money’.
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2.3.2 Put Options
A put option is again a financial contract between the two parties, buyer and seller of
the option. It gives the holder of the option a right (but not an obligation) to sell in
contrary to the call option the underlying asset on a certain date for a contracted price
(De Weert (2006)). In other words a seller of an option wants to protect for example his
shares under a certain price. A contract with an investor is signed to buy this shares at
the contracted price at a certain date. In return the option holder pays the buyer a fee,
if the shares rise above the contracted value he does not have to sell and if the shares
fall below he is protected. Therefore the holder looses in this case only the fee paid for
the option. In the money is not defined as how much the value of the option falls below
the excercise price.
Option Price 
Strike Price Share Price at  
Maturity 
Payoff Line 
Profit Line 
0 
Figure 2.2: Payoff of a European Put option
If the option would be far beyond the excercise price it would be referred as be deep
in the money. Generally speaking the option holder makes a profit if the price of the
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underlying falls beyond the excercise price so he is compensated for the premium he
paid before. This is again shown for a long European-style option in Figure 2.2. Note
than the value of the underlying can’t fall below the value of zero, therefore the value of
the put option is said to be bounded.
2.4 Types of Real Options
The literature discusses several different types of real options with slightly differences in
the number of types. Brealey et al. (2008) define four main types of real options with
(1) a option to expand if the investment suceeds, (2) the option to abandon a project,
(3) the option to vary the mix of output and (4) the option to wait and learn before
investing. We will focus in our closer describtion of types mainly on the summary of
Trigeorgis (1996) and Trigeorgis (2001) discussing seven different types of real options.
Trigeorgis (1996) formulates four basic types of real options (1) options to defer, (2)
options to contract/expand, (3) opton to abandon for salvage value and (4) option to
switch use. Trigeorgis (1996) then ranks the real options depending on exclusiveness
of ownership into proprietary options and shared options. Childs and Triantis (1999)
mentions summarizes the types of real options on only three types: (1) options to grow,
(2) contraction options and (3) flexibility options.
2.4.1 Option to defer
The description of this type of real option follows Trigeorgis (1996) and Trigeorgis (2001)
and is also one of the above summarized real option types by Brealey et al. (2008) namely
the option to wait and learn before investing. According to Copeland and Tufano (2004)
this option is also called deferral call option. In this type of option the management
or option holder is allowed to wait some time to see if ouput prices justify further
investments. Therefore summarizing Brealey et al. (2008) and Copeland and Tufano
(2004) the right to wait and learn before investion is the option to defer.
Generally this option is a call option but it can be either European-style or American-
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style option. The usage of this project is mostly in natural-resource investment as
Trigeorgis (1996) point out with the examples of constructing or building a plant or
developing an oil or gas field.
2.4.2 Option to Expand and Option to Contract
An option to expand can be described as taking an option today may allow the option
holder to consider and to take other projects in the future. Therefore it can be described
as the right to increase the scale of production when the payoff of output is higher than
the cost of increaisng the scale. The option to expand is also a call option.
On the other hand a the option to contract is the right to decrease the scale of production
when the loss from producing at current scale is higher than the cost of reducing the
scale. This is contrary to the option to expand a put option and can be used to decrease
the loss. Both of the described options can be either American or European-style options.
2.4.3 Option to Abandon
If the cash flows don’t meet expectations the options holder may sometimes abandon
the investment. Since we will use this option for our mathematical project valuation in
further chapters we will show an example of this option.
Consider a research and development process with different stages to pass before entering
the market. Cash flows start as soon as the product enters the market put not before.
Assuming an investment which does not pass one of the stages before entering the market
the option holder is likely to abandon the option since further investments will not return
expected cash flows with a high probability. A reason for abandoning the investment
would be met as soon as the costs exceed future cash flows and the investment is not
taken to allow future investments.
Summarized this means that that this option allows the option holder to save itself from
further losses and can make therefore the project more valuable. It is equivalent to a
put option and could be both European-style or American-style. According to Trigeorgis
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(1996) even if this option is simple it is widely used in capital-intensive industries such
as pharmaceutical industry.
2.4.4 Time-to-Build Option
Considering an investment which has several stages, the option holder has the right
to abandon the project if new information within these stages is unfavourable. This
is refered as an compound option which is an abandon option on an abandon option.
Following what we described for the option to abandon this is extremly relevant for R&D
intensive industries Trigeorgis (1996).
2.5 Real Option valuation research
In the following we want to give a short overview on valuation techniques discussed in
the literature which had an impact on this thesis. Hartmann and Hassan (2006) discuss
in their paper the application of real options analysis for pharmaceutical R&D project
valuation. They present empirical results out of a survey which asked for the use of real
options analysis within the project valuation of pharmaceutical companies. Elmquist
and Le Masson (2009) present a evaluation framework for building innovative capabili-
ties and Cortazar et al. (2001) present a real options model for the optimal exploration
investments under uncertainty.
Another recent paper was published by Cassimon et al. (2011) who incorporate tech-
nical risk in compound real option models to value a pharmaceutical R&D licensing
opportunity. The same idea is pointed out by Pennings and Sereno (2011) who evaluate
pharmaceutical R&D unter technical and economic uncertainty. Jacob and Kwak (2003)
give an insight into innovative techniques to evaluate pharmaceutical R&D projects and
Perlitz et al. (1999) discussed in general the real options valuation as a R&D project
evaluation tool. Considering the valuation of exploration and production asssets, Dias
(2004) gives a general overview of real options models.
We will present in this thesis a technique to value one project, Van Bekkum et al. (2009)
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discuss the perspective of real option on R&D portfolio diversification. Especially in-
teresting concerning our case was the paper Brouthers and Dikova (2010) focusing on
acquisitions and real options as the greenfield alternative.
2.6 Simple Valuation Methods
2.6.1 Net Present Value
We have discussed together with GlaxoSmithKline Austria the parameters for the case.
We proposed the parameters used by Schwartz (2004) and they were slightly changed
by GSK Austria to fit our case better.
The method we have focused on in this thesis, the Least Squares Monte Carlo sim-
ulation, is commonly not used in reality. Therefore we want to present the common
model to evaluate investment, namely the net present value method.
Since we assume a maximum investment rate which is equal to the completion costs
for each stage the investment rates can be described as in Table 2.1:
Table 2.1: Input Parameters for NPV Analysis
Period Costs of Completion Time in Phasej Investment Rate
Phase I 10 2 5
Phase II 35 2 17.5
Phase III 75 3 37.5
Approval 20 3 10
The cash flow rate, the terminal cash flow multiple and the real risk adjustable discount
rate are taken from Schwartz (2004).
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Table 2.2: Assumed Input Parameters for NPV Analysis (Schwartz (2004))
Cash Flow Rate 20
Terminal Cash Flow Multiple 5
Real Risk Adjustable Discount Rate 10%
As for the whole case we assume a period of 20 years which is divided into 10 years of
research and development and 10 years of patent protection which equals a monopolistic
situation. As a period of time we consider the year 2011 as the start of research and
development with an end date in year 2031. Since we face cash flows only after the 10
years of research and development are finished we first calculate the discounted cashflows
in between 2021 and 2030.
Table 2.3: Discounted Cashflows
Time 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029
Cash Flows 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Values 18.18 16.52 15.03 13.66 12.41 11.29 10.26 9.33 8.48 38.55
According to the table above the net present value at 2021 is calculated as the sum
of all present values for each year between 2021 to 2030. For our case the net present
value of the project at 2021 is 153.73 millon.
In the next step we include the costs for Phase I, Phase II, Phase III and Approval.
These are weighted by transition probabilities which are taken from DiMasi et al. (2003)
and then discounted to the basis year 2011.
Table 2.4: NPV Calculation
Period Probability Investment Rate Weighted In-
vestment Rate
Discounted In-
vestment Rate
Phase I 0.71 -5 -3.55 -3.55
Phase II 0.314 -17.5 -5.495 -4.54
Phase III 0.215 -37.5 -8.0625 -6.05
Approval 0.2 -10 -2 -1.36
2021 NPV 0.2 153.73 30.74 11.85
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If we sum up the net present value at 2021 which is again discounted with the dis-
counted investment rates 2011-2021 the net present value is calculated as -3.66. A
negative NPV would mean that the project would substract value from the firm. There-
fore the decision making based on the NPV is not to start the project3
We have chosen a quite high discount rate with 10% and came to the presented results.
If we assume a real risk adjustable discount rate of 3% the NPV becomes nearly 5 million
dollars. This shows that the assumptions we make in the concept of NPV are not suffi-
cient and the problem is that projects are often underestimated. The problem hereby is
that the NPV underestimates the flexibility of the project and therefore underestimates
the project at all.
The purpose of this NPV calculation was to show that there is a need for a more accurate
modell of investment evaluation, which will be presented with the Least Squares Monte
Carlo Simulation.
3Note that the NPV is very much dependent on the real risk adjustable discount rate.
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Chapter 3
Costs of Research and Development
Through the discussion process with GlaxoSmithKline we came to the conclusion that
there is a need in this thesis to present in detail the research and development process
and its underlying costs. In the first section of this chapter the research and development
process is discussed. The purpose of this section is to give a deeper insight into the R&D
process and to give an understanding that the investment in pharmaceutical R&D differs
substantial from other investments. The last part of the following section deals with the
patent protection system in the EU and points out some reasons why a patent protection
can be increased. Grabowski and Vernon (1994) point out that the patent protections
have a significant effect on the expected cash flows, therefore it is necessary to discuss
patent protections for a valid modell.
Section two provides insights into the estimation of costs of pharmaceutical research
and development. GlaxoSmithKline as most other companies as well as the scientific
community rely mostly on the research by DiMasi et al. (2003). We use results provided
by various studies of DiMasi et al. (1991), DiMasi et al. (1995), DiMasi (2000), DiMasi
(2001) and DiMasi et al. (2003) and compare them to the results from Public Citizen
(2001) which comes to totally different results. We will present the data used, the
methodology and the results of both and afterwards review the main ideas and especially
the data and methodology used. DiMasi et al. (1991) and OTA (1993) came to their
results either by basing on a case study for a specific drug, by ignoring the possibility
of failure or using aggregate data. Since these estimations are important for our further
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analysis it is crucial to discuss them in further detail.
3.1 Research and Development
In this section we want to present the research and development process and the cost
structure of this process.
First we take a brief look at the research and development process and the different
phases. The trials begin with laboratory trials. Scientists define a target in a certain
disease and search for a molecule which has an impact due to this target. After this
process the scientists are able to patent a candidate for an innovative drug. The next
step is to verify the positive impact of this candidate. The research and development
process has changed in the last years. The drug ADALT c©from Bayer (used for diseases
concerning the coronary arteries) for example took the chemist Friedrich Bossert 16 years
in a trial and error principle to find the substance nifedipine (Mahlich (2006)). Nowadays
this process is done by High Throughput Screening roboters. Due to Computer Aided
Drug Design the time used for this process has been optimized in the last years, so
the question is: why do costs rise? Therefore the first part of this section gives a brief
overview over the structure of the clinical trials and should help to understand why costs
for R&D rise within the last years:
3.1.1 Phase I
Phase I of the clinical trials is the first time of testing the new drug on humans. In this
first phase a relatively small group of volunteers is formed. This phase deals mostly with
pharmacokinetics and pharmacovigilance. Pharmacokinetics describes the tolerability of
a drug and how the organism reacts about the substance. Pharmacovigilance describes
the safety of the study drug. If scientists are aware of the risks the group of probands
consists of people affected with this certain disease.
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3.1.2 Phase II
When Phase I is completed the trials go on to Phase II. In this phase the results from
Phase I have to be proven on a larger group sample. In general the size of the group lies
between 20 and 300 patients. People involved in this study are volunteers and in some
cases get paid for their participation. It is also the first time that the group of volunteers
is divided in two groups to prove the positive results of a substance in comparison to a
placebo.
3.1.3 Phase III
The groups of patients involved in Phase III consist of 300-3000 persons, depending on
the type of disease and medical condition which is studied. This group of patients is
then divided into two separate groups: one group gets the substance which scientists
want to test and the other group gets a placebo. Because of the group size of patients,
the long duration compared to the other phases and the two different data sets (one
with placebo and one with the real substance), Phase III trials are the most expensive
and time-consuming trials within the whole process.
3.1.4 Phase IV
In the clinical trials Phase IV is also described as the Post Marketing Surveillance Trial.
Trials in Phase IV are made after the authorization of the drug and are therefore mostly
for marketing reasons and for improvement of the drugs. If there are any harmful effects
discovered in Phase IV trials this may cause that the drug is no longer sold.
3.1.5 Entry of drugs in phases
To understand the difficulties and the costs in R&D it is important to know how large the
percentage is which enters one of the four phases. This percentage is shown in Figure
3.1. Obviously the percentage of entering phase I is 100%, but it is very interesting
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that only 71 percent pass even the first phase and enter the second phase. For the
cost analyses the percentage of drugs entering the market is the most interesting one.
The Congressional Budget Office published the number of 21.5 percent of drugs which
entered the first phase entered also the market (CBO (2006)).
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Figure 3.1: Entry of drugs in phases (DiMasi et al. (2003))
3.1.6 Patent Protection
Like most other products pharmaceuticals enjoy patent protection for 20 years. However,
there are striking differences between drugs and other innovative products. In other
industries products apply for a patent shortly before market entry. Pharmaceutical
researchers and companies patent their drug long before it enters the market. They are
patented as intellectual property of the inventor. Between patenting and availability of
the drug to patients an average of 11.8 years elapses, which are essential for all stages
of the investigations (DiMasi et al. (2003)). If you take the patent protection, which
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applies to all industries equally, one can expect an average of eight years of patent life
for an innovative pharmaceutical product (DiMasi et al. (2003)). For this reason, it is
possible for the patentee to apply for additional protection (Supplementary Protection
Certificate, SPC). This additional protection extends the patent term by up to 5 years. In
addition to this protection option, there are other legal provisions that can be exploited
by pharmaceutical companies:
3.1.7 Data Exclusivity
In addition to the patent rules there is also a so-called data exclusivity throughout the
EU. For all submissions from 30 October 2005 on it holds that studies that were used
for the new drugs can be used at the earliest after 10 years as a basis for the approval
of a generic product.
After 10 years, it is possible for generic companies to use in the approval process the
same studies that were already prepared for the approval of the original drug. With
this new law inventor and patent holder can assume that their studies are protected for
10 years. Only after 10 years it is allowed that generic companies bring drugs on the
market (’8 +2’ rule).
Pharmaceutical companies, which act as proprietor of the drug found, are allowed to
operate as a monopolist for 10 years and amortise the high research and development
costs1. If it is possible for the holder of the authorization to use the drug for other
indications and treatment methods, the protection of 10 years can be extended to 11
years (8 +2 +1’ rule).
Special features in European patent law:
• Roche - Bolar - Provision: The preparation of documents for follow-up or generic
products trials and studies of the patented drug may already be made during the
1Note that we assume innovative products which fall under a monopoly status after entering the
market.
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patent. This is not a special feature, but the European version of the Roche-Bolar
amendment in the USA.
• Paediatric drugs: This clause exists since January 2007 in the European pharma-
ceutical law. The clause indicates that all new drugs in the EU must be tested on
the application for children. If it turns out that new, patented drugs are suitable
for children, additional protection for 6 months is allowed. After the expiry of the
patent, data exclusivity can be obtained for an additional year if new pediatric
data is submitted within the first 8 years of data exclusivity.
• Orphan Drugs: The patent holders of pharmaceuticals, which can be used to treat
a rare disease (in the EU: less than 230.000 patients per year or 5 per 10.000
inhabitants), can request an orphan drug status at the EMA (European Medicines
Agency). Orphan drugs enjoy market exclusivity under certain conditions to their
approval. That is, after the initial approval of an Orphan Drug the EMA may
not further approve applications for approval for a drug for this indication or issue
a registration in this indication. In certain cases, the market exclusivity can be
reduced to six years (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1999).
It is also clear that we face on both sides, the demand and the supply side, factors
which are costs drivers. Seiter (2005) describes these costs drivers in ’HNP Brief #7-
Pharmaceuticals: Cost containment, Pricing, Reimbursement ’. What we have presented
in the last pages about patent rights shows that investing in R&D in pharmaceuticals
and entering the market is costly and not that easy at all. On one hand it could be very
difficult to access the market or on the other hand the existing market could be simply
too small for more companies. These barriers in entering the market could drive up the
price for a new drug. What we will see in the following pages is that even if they are
critising each other both the studie by DiMasi et al. (DiMasi et al. (1991), DiMasi et al.
(1995), DiMasi (2000), DiMasi (2001) and DiMasi et al. (2003)) and the Public Citizen
(2001) report estimate a high number for R&D costs for pharmaceuticals. Therefore
companies producing drugs will point out every clinical advantage of a new drug over
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an old one even if it is marginal (Seiter, 2005). This is a cost driver on the supply side
since the purpose is to shift the demand to the newer and in most cases more costly
products.
On the demand side we also face cost drivers but in contrast to the supply side we face
cost drivers through the volume of drugs which are bought and demographic changes.
Health systems have to cope with a demographic - aging. Since treatments, hygiene and
the quality of life became better and better over the years the demographic situation
in OECD countries has changed dramatically. The volume of drugs sold is driven by
this aging population and by the spread of diseases like HIV and malaria in developing
countries (Seiter, 2005). Another cost driver on demand side is the physicians. The
marketing efforts of companies selling drugs are huge and therefore physicians are guided
to prescribe drugs with very little clinical advantages and higher costs. What has a huge
impact on the demand side is the information asymmetry. Information asymmetry is
given if one party has better information than the other party. For example in most
cases the doctor knows more about the health status of the patient than the patient
himself. This information asymmetry could lead to an acquisition of treatments and
drugs without really knowing about the efficiency of the new treatment.
3.2 Costs of Research and Development
Together with Grabowski and Hansen, DiMasi has published since the early 90s a lot of
papers concerning R&D costs for pharmaceuticals. The methodology hasn’t changed a
lot from the year 2003 paper by DiMasi et al. and the first paper in 1991. Afterwards
this methodology and the data used by DiMasi et al. (2003) is discussed with the help
of the 2001 Public Citizen (2001) paper on ”Rx R&D Myths: The Case Against The
Drug Industry’s R&D ’Scare Card’”. This paper criticizes the methodology used by
DiMasi et al. (1995) and calculates R&D costs without using opportunity costs. In the
last section we want to concentrate on a critical review of both of these econometric
studies with the help of the Ernst&Young LLP Pharmaceutical Industry R&D Costs:
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Key Findings about the Citizen Report.
3.2.1 R&D Costs by DiMasi et al
Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen and Henry Grabowski examined in their 2003
study ”The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs” the R&D
costs for a new drug. For their study they took a random sample of 68 drugs from a
survey of 10 pharmaceutical firms (DiMasi et al. (2003)). With these data they estimated
the average pre-tax costs of a new drug. As these three authors are the leading experts in
the estimation of R&D costs, three of their papers serve are presented in more detail in
this thesis. In the study from DiMasi et al. (2003) costs for R&D were estimated at 802
million dollars for a new drug. In comparison to the market entries in the 1980s the total
capitalized costs grew with a yearly growth rate of 7.4% (DiMasi et al. (2003)) above
general price inflation. The main reason for this increase of R&D costs is associated with
the size and number of clinical trials, which grew constant since the 1990s (DiMasi et al.
(2003)). The spending in R&D in the last 25 years increased nearly to 50%. The main
part of this increase took place in the early 1980s. Since then the R&D expenditures
increased constantly by 19 percent. In the following abstracts we take a deeper look at
the data and try to figure out a concrete image of R&D costs.
3.2.2 Data
Before discussing the structure of costs of the R&D process we should take a brief look at
the data which was used int the paper by DiMasi et al. (2003). For the study of DiMasi
et al. (2003) 10 multinational firms provided data about their new drug R&D costs. If
taking the pharmaceutical sales as a measure of a firm’s size, four of the survey firms are
top 10 companies, another four are among the next 10 largest firms, and the remaining
two are outside the top 20 (PJB Publications (2000))2 For this sample of private firms it
is not clear, whether the fact that the basic development was performed in government or
2Please note that all the companies in this sample are private firms. Universities or public research
labs are not included in this sample.
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academic labs has any effects on the results. DiMasi et al. (2003) use for answering this
question the National Institutes of Health Report (2000) which comes to the conclusion,
that of 47 FDA-approved drugs that had reached at least US 500 million in US sales in
1999, the government had direct or indirect use or ownership patent rights to only four
of them (NIH (2000)). This can be confirmed by the Tufts CSDD database, which shows
that out of 284 new drugs approved in the United States from 1990 to 1999, 93,3% where
originated by industrial sector. The firms which are presented in the survey account for
42% of pharmaceutical R&D expenditures. From the 68 drugs which were investigated
in the process, 61 are small molecule chemical entities, four are recombinant proteins,
two are monoclonal antibodies, and one is a vaccine DiMasi et al. (2003).
3.2.3 Methodology
The expected costs of a research and development process are not easy to measure. To
understand the model which was used the equation in DiMasi et al. (2003) for expected
costs in the clinical period should be presented. In all of the three phases in clinical trial
there is a certain probability that the drug will enter the phase. We define c as the costs
in R&D for a randomly chosen drug. The expected costs therefore are a combination
of the probabilities of entering a certain phase and the population mean costs for drugs
that enter phases IIII,
c = E(c) = pIµI|e + pIIµII|e + +pIIIµIII|e + +pAµA|e
where pI , pII and pIII are the probabilities that a randomly selected entity will enter
phases I, II or III and pA stands for the probability that a long term animal testing
will be conducted. µs stand for the population mean costs for drugs that enter phases
IIII, and specifically µA|e stands for long-term animal testing.
3.2.4 Duration and structure of the developing phase
Table 3 is divided in three sections: in the first section we see the average duration of
the preclinical phase. In the preclinical phase scientists search for molecules which have
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some impact on the symptoms of a disease.
Table 3.1: Average Duration of an R&D Process (DiMasi et al. (2003))
Preclinical phase Clinical Trials Total
and Authorization
4.3 Years 7.5 Years 11.8 Years
The process of finding the substance for the target takes place in the laboratory. This
is one of the reasons why the time used for this process is relatively short compared to
the other phases in the R&D process. The time estimated by DiMasi et al. (2003) for the
preclinical phase is 4.3 years. The estimation for the clinical trials phase, which can be
seen in Table 3, points out that in average 7.5 years are spent in this phase. As mentioned
before since the late 1990s clinical trials became more complex. The pharmaceutical
firms changed from producing drugs for acute diseases to drugs for chronic diseases.
A chronic disease lasts for a long time so the studies had to be extended to capture
significant results concerning the effects of the drug (most of the recent studies take up
to 2-3 years in Phase III). Also the marketing authorization of a new drug has become
more difficult due to new laws in several countries. As a result the group size of patients
in a study increased. Summarized, this leads to a total development period of 11.8
years. Table 4 shows the cost analysis from DiMasi et al. (2003) and assigns them to
the different stages in R&D.
Table 3.2: Cost Estimations (DiMasi et al. (2003))
Preclinical phase Clinical Trials Total
and Authorization
Direct costs 121 282 203
Opportunity costs 214 185 399
Total costs 335 467 802
In new estimations also opportunity costs are part of the total costs. Opportunity
costs describe costs which occur when choosing one alternative but therefore forgoing
another. Following the arguments by DiMasi et al. (2003) from an economic point of view
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it is not sufficient to take only direct costs into account as not every drug can be placed
on the market. Therefore the development and research costs for these fails appear as
opportunity costs in the calculation. Opportunity costs exist in every industrial sector
but in the pharmaceutical industry they are extremely relevant as the capital is tied for
a long time due to the long research and development duration (DiMasi et al. (2003)).
The calculated costs include both direct and opportunity costs thus increasing costs can
also imply an increasing number of failures (DiMasi et al. (2003)). Figure 3.1 showed
the percentage of drugs in the specific development phases. It is understood that every
single drug goes through phase one. As it can easily be seen the number of drugs which
go on to phase two declines by almost a third and in phase three the number of drugs
is as small as 30% of the original number. Only about 21.5% are admitted for the last
developing phase, the marketing authorization procedure.
3.2.5 The average R&D costs
With the summarized data in Figure 3.2 we can see an increase in the costs between the
years 1976 and 2000. The costs have been sextupled up to 802 million dollars in the year
2000. Within 20 years the expenditures have changed dramatically. The first estimation
from Hansen (1979) arrives at the conclusion that a total amount of 138 million dollars
is needed for the R&D process of a new drug3. There is a constant increase from 1979 to
2000 with an estimated amount of 319 million dollars in 1988 and 445 million dollars in
1992. The reason for the rapid increase between 1992 and 2000 could be the change in
the strategy of large pharmaceutical firms. Large pharmaceutical companies have turned
their attention from acute towards chronic diseases. The consequence of this switch is
that the time spent for clinical trials increased which then leads to higher costs in the
R&D process. Acute diseases require a rather short time in clinical trials because their
active pharmaceutical ingredient has to achieve a punctual effect. On the other hand
drugs for chronic diseases have to prove their value over a long time. For that reason
the clinical trials have to last over a long time to assure that the failure in testing the
3This estimation includes as always the opportunity costs generated by failed attempts, Figure 3.2
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substance is minimized.
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Figure 3.2: Average R&D costs (Hansen (1979), DiMasi et al. (1991) and DiMasi et al.
(2003))
3.2.6 Structure of the costs
After we have seen the time required for research and development in the last sections,
we now look at the cost structure in these explicit years. The years are chosen as a
comparison of the studies which were made in those years (Hansen (1979), DiMasi et al.
(1991) and DiMasi et al. (2003)). First we look at the pure, inflation adjusted data.
These costs include the pre-clinical, the clinical and the total costs. Within the years
from 1979 and 2000 the structure of the costs in R&D phases has changed dramatically.
Figure 3.3 shows how the money is spent between preclinical and clinical phase.
Not only the total amount of money spent in R&D has increased but also the distribu-
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Figure 3.3: Structure of the costs in R&D phases
tion has changed. Table 3.3 compares the capitalized costs with the ”out-of-pocket”-costs
of the three studies from Hansen (1979), DiMasi (2001), and DiMasi et al. (2003).
Table 3.3: Annual growth rates in order to ’out of pockets’ costs (Hansen (1979), DiMasi
(2001), and DiMasi et al. (2003))
Period Out-of-Pocket
Preclinical(%) Clinical(%) Total(%)
1970-1980 7.8 6.1 13.9
1980-1990 2.3 11.8 14.1
The time periods are limited to 10 years, thus the cost of bringing drugs onto the
market in the 1970’s are described by the study of Hansen (1979), the costs of the 1980’s
are from DiMasi et al. (1991) and the costs of the 1990’s originate from DiMasi et al.
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Table 3.4: Annual growth rates in order to capitalized costs (Hansen (1979), DiMasi
(2001), and DiMasi et al. (2003))
Period Capitalized
Preclinical(%) Clinical(%) Total(%)
1970-1980 10.6 7.3 17.9
1980-1990 3.5 12.2 15.7
(2003). The total ”out of pocket”-costs of the period 1970-1980 are 13.9%, thus they are
almost identical to the ”out-of-pocket”-costs of the period 1980-1990 which are 14.1%.
Hence we should draw our attention to the costs divided into the specific phases of the
developing procedure rather than to the total costs. Therefore we take the study of Di-
Masi et al. (2003) into consideration which divides costs for the preclinical phase and the
clinical phase. As it can be seen during the years 1970-1980 the ”out-of-pocket”-costs
were rather uniformly distributed between preclinical and clinical phase. The costs in the
clinical phase will increase more and more as the time of study increases and therefore
the costs of this phase rise. The number of drugs in the first phase of development which
were admitted to the market declined to 10% in the last few years (DiMasi et al. (2003)).
3.2.7 Reasons for increase in R&D costs
As we have seen in the last paragraphs one reason for the increase in R&D is the turn
in production from drugs for acute to drugs for chronic diseases. The study of DiMasi
et al. (2003) comes to the conclusion that the trials and studies in the R&D process for
chronic disease must generate more data and take longer to show long-term benefit in
patients. This is one of the main reasons for the increase in R&D expenditures over the
last years. In summary the study of DiMasi et al. (2003) comes to a list of reasons for
the increase in drug development costs over the last years:
• Increase of failed attempts in the R&D process (in the state of clinical trials).
• Regulations, which ask for a longer and larger clinical trials.
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• The increase of clinical trials itself4.
• The attention is more and more turned to producing drugs for chronic diseases5.
• The introduction of new methods in the R&D process and the restructuring of the
production process involve new costs. When a new method is introduced it entails
some run-in period.
Additionally, studies found that only one in every 5000-10000 molecules screened in
the laboratory makes it to the market DiMasi (2001). The increase in R&D costs was
shown by Figure 3.2. It shows the increase from 137 million dollars in 1976 published
by Hansen (1979) up to 802 million dollars in 2000 published by DiMasi et al. (2003).
The other data are taken from the paper DiMasi et al. (1991).
3.3 Public Citizen
The Public Citizen (2001) report criticizes that the studies by DiMasi et al and the argu-
ments made by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA)
about the cost situation of R&D do not display the reality. Their analysis suggests that
the risk which is faced for research and development of new drugs isn’t that high due to
the fact that the industry gets subsidized a lot and taxes on profits are very low (Public
Citizen, 2001).
3.3.1 Data
The Public Citizen (2001)report uses data from the PhRMA which is divided in two
categories:
1. ”domestic” data which describes all expenditures by companies (both American
and foreign) in the U.S. and
4Also trials which are made to differentiate the product of one firm from the product of another firm
are considered here.
5This assumption only holds for large pharmaceutical firms. Small firms search for a niche therefore
it’s supposable that they produce drugs for acute diseases.
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2. ”abroad” expenditures, which describe expenditures by U.S. companies abroad
(Public Citizen (2001)).
For the analysis data concerning the market entries of drugs are taken from the FDA.
The problem here is that the FDA reports the number of drugs entering a certain market
without any connection to where the expenditures on R&D were done.
3.3.2 Methodology
The Public Citizen (2001) report used a simple model to estimate R&D costs. They
used the data provided by the PhRMA on the expenditures in R&D and divided it by
the amount of drugs entering the market. In comparison to DiMasi et al they didn’t use
the opportunity cost of capital with the idea to show the actual expenditures for R&D.
This major difference in the analysis of R&D costs compared to DiMasi et al will be
discussed later.
3.3.3 The average R&D costs
In the following results derived from the Public Citizen (2001) report are shown. For
the results 7 year periods are taken which should simulate the time between R&D ex-
penditure (in other words the duration of the different phases we have discussed at the
beginning) and the market entry of a certain drug on the market. Then these data are
compared to the number of drugs entering the market reported by the FDA. Using the
example by the Public Citizen (2001) report from 1988 through 1994 PhRMA reported
69.7 billion of total R&D expenditures which corresponds to 88 billion dollars inflation
adjusted in 2000. Then the average over these 7 years is taken which yields 12.5 billion
per year.
This is compared to the number of approved drugs by the FDA from 1994-2000. Since
the FDA has approved 667 new drugs in this time frame 95.3 approved drugs are calcu-
lated for each year (Public Citizen, 2001).
The strategy of the authors is to look at the after-tax R&D expenditures per new drug.
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They argue that R&D is taxed in the U.S. with a factor of 0.6 for each dollar spent,
which yields to 71 million dollars after tax expenditures derived out of 107.6 million
dollars pre-tax R&D expenditures.
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Looking at Table 3.5 provided by the Public Citizen (2001) report for the Average
R&D Cost per New Approved Drug during the 1990s we see that with the help of the
data provided by PhRMA and the FDA pre-tax and after-tax expenditures per drug are
calculated for 7 year R&D time periods between 1984 and 1994. Compared to the cost
structure seen in DiMasi et al. (1991), DiMasi et al. (1995), DiMasi (2001) DiMasi et al.
(2003) and Hansen (1979) the expenditure is not anywhere as low as the numbers by the
Public Citizen (2001) report6. The Public Citizen (2001) report argues that DiMasi et al.
(1991) in their studies used data on the most expensive entities for R&D, namely the
new chemical entities (NCE’s). To be comparable to these studies the Public Citizen
(2001) report tested their methodology on NCE’s data. Table 7 shows that for new
molecular or chemical entities the R&D expenditure doubles also in the Public Citizen
(2001) report but is still lower than the results by DiMasi et al. (1991).
Important to notice is that the Public Citizen (2001)report argues that NCE’s are
only a part of R&D and the analysis of them is not that important as the studies by
DiMasi et al suggest. As discussed before DiMasi et al. (1991), DiMasi et al. (1995),
DiMasi (2000), DiMasi (2001) and DiMasi et al. (2003) used for their data NCE’s to
derive the total R&D expenditure.
3.4 Conclusion
We have presented two methods for estimating the R&D costs for drugs. Now we want
to discuss the differences between these two methods. As mentioned before the Pub-
lic Citizen (2001) report does not include the opportunity costs of capital. The study by
Ernst&Young LLP (2001) confirms DiMasi et al. (2003) who described the R&D process
as highly risky. The economic theory describes opportunity costs as the opportunities
one would have by using the money spent for other investments. Especially in sectors
where we are confronted with high risk investments it is necessary for an analysis to
include these opportunity costs in the analysis since the decision maker decides in this
6Note that the argument includes inflation adjusted expenditures
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situation for a higher risk investment and against one with a lower probability of failing.
We think that the use of opportunity costs as a decision making instrument to decide
whether or not investing in a certain investment is a standard procedure. Our critiques
on the DiMasi et al studies focus on the direct inclusion of these opportunity costs into
the overall R&D expenditure estimations. We described that DiMasi et al. (2003) calcu-
lated out-of-pocket costs of 403 million dollars and the opportunity costs of 399 million
dollars and by summing them up DiMasi et al. (2003) came to the result of 802 million
dollars pre-approval costs. It has to be clarified if opportunity costs are the costs for an
alternative direct investment or if they consider the case where one spends 10.000 dollars
now on R&D with a high risk and waits for ten or more years until he gets anything out
from this.
Comparing the methodology used by DiMasi et al with the methodology used by the
Public Citizen (2001)we came to the conclusion that the model used by the Public Citizen
(2001)is more or less a rough calculation of how costs for the R&D process look like.
Since we agree with the Ernst&Young LLP (2001) study that the R&D process in drugs
is highly risky, including probabilities of entering different phases in the model makes
more sense than simply dividing the expenditures by the number of drugs entering
the market. Therefore calculating the expected costs by incorporating the transition
probabilities will lead to a more significant result than dividing sales by the number of
drug entries.
Both Ernst&Young LLP (2001) and the OTA (1993) study conclude that the data
used by DiMasi et al. (2003) shows a substantial consistency between aggregate R&D
spending estimates and cash outlays per NCE estimated by DiMasi (Ernst&Young LLP
(2001)). After the review of the data used by DiMasi et al and Public Citizen (2001)we
found shortcomings in both studies. By going through the paper by DiMasi et al. (2003)
and especially the data section we did not find any information about the drugs which
were chosen for this study. The data used in the study consists of ten multinational
pharmaceutical firms. Four companies in the data set are top 10 companies, another
four are among the next 10 largest firms, and the remaining two are outside the top 20.
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We also know that from the 68 drugs reported: 61 are small molecule chemical entities,
4 are recombinant proteins, 2 are monoclonal antibodies and 1 is a vaccine. What we
don’t know is why these drugs were reported from the pharmaceutical companies. Since
we don’t know why the firms reported these drugs and how the process of reporting took
place, we cannot follow the Ernst&Young LLP (2001) report.
The usage of new chemical entities in the data was described by the Public Citizen
(2001)report as a shortcoming of the data used by DiMasi et al. (1991). To our opinion
new chemical entities may cause a large increase in public health. As we have described
in the beginning new chemical entities have to pass several phases before they are al-
lowed to enter the market. This NCE has never been tested on therapeutic efficiency
on humans before. We have also described that a generic medicament is allowed after
some time to use the study on clinical trials and enters the market without arranging
own clinical trials. But the main question is if the study wants to estimate the average
overall R&D costs in the pharmaceutical industry or not. We have mentioned several
reasons why NCE’s are different from other drugs. If the interest would be an average
R&D expenditure estimation it would be not sufficient to include only those, even if
their impact is higher to public health (which cannot be proven in this paper).
We have shown that another huge difference between the two estimations is which type
of results they used. DiMasi et al used pre-tax estimations whereas the Public Citi-
zen (2001)used after-tax estimations. Considering after-tax estimations leads to lower
R&D costs since the Public Citizen (2001)report used the highest corporate tax rate
and concluded that the R&D process of drugs is subsidized. We have looked through
various scientific papers considering the R&D costs for drugs and found that almost all
considered pre-tax estimations. The reason is that taxing the R&D process with the
highest corporate tax does not include the financial profile of the business. Another
point is that tax deductibility in this case has nothing to do with a subsidy for R&D in
this sector. It has the purpose of not double taxing and therefore deducting expenses
like R&D and salaries which accrue to other entities that pay income tax (Ernst&Young
LLP (2001)). By using after-tax estimations one would tax the R&D process twice and
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it is obvious that this is not the same as subsidizing the R&D process.
As far as we have studied existing literature, reviews and data we came to the conclusion
that Public Citizen (2001)highlights some difficulties and shortcomings when estimating
the costs on R&D in the pharmaceutical industry. But we believe that the estimations
which were done by Public Citizen (2001)were made explicitly with the idea that the
costs by DiMasi et al. (1991) were overestimated. Since many of the arguments used
by DiMasi et al. (2003) and Public Citizen (2001) do not stand up to close scrutiny we
cannot agree with the study by Ernst&Young LLP (2001) and therefore cannot consider
the studies by DiMasi et al as an estimation for R&D costs. As described, the shortcom-
ings of DiMasi et al. (2003) are the incorporation of opportunity costs and the data set
used. The shortcomings of Public Citizen (2001) are in our opinion the after-tax results
used, the methodology and also the used data set.
We conclude that the assumptions ade by Schwartz (2004) based on DiMasi et al. (2003)
as well as the assumptions by GlaxoSmithKline follow the results of our analysis.

Chapter 4
Monte Carlo Simulation
In this chapter we want to present the Least Squares Monte Carlo algorithm (LSM) used
by Schwartz (2004). Schwartz (2004) introduced his model as a one stage process. The
assumption hereby is that the whole research and development process is not divided into
different phases and assumed to be a one stage process. Schwartz (2004) has implemented
his one stage process to value the R&D process of a pharmaceutical company in Fortran.
In this thesis we want to implement the model presented by Schwartz (2004) in MATLAB
and change the input parameters to fit the case of GlaxoSmithKline and Apeiron to
value their milestone payment agreement. Schwartz (2004) proposed in the Appendix
an extension to this problem to more accurately fit the R&D process. This multi-stage
model will be presented and implemented in the next chapters.
4.1 Introduction
The project valuation method underlying the LSM algorithm following Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001) is based on the general option pricing theory of Black and Scholes (1973),
Merton (1973), Harrison and Kreps (1979), Harrison and Pliska (1981) and Heath et al.
(1992) we have presented before. A multifactor Gauss Markov implementation of the
proposed valuation method by Heath et al. (1992) is presented in Brace and Musiela
(1994).
The pricing of financial options in generally by simulations is discussed frequently in
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literature in the last years. Bossaerts (1989) discussed in a early contribution this way
of valuing options by simulations. Boyle et al. (1997), Broadie and Glasserman (1998),
Tsitsiklis and Van Roy (1999), Joshi et al. (2007) and Barone-Adesi et al. (2008) used
simulations for valuing real options and had therefore an impact on this thesis as their
suggestions concerning simulations were implemented in our model.
In the last years a lot of papers were published improving the valuation method by
Schwartz (2004). An impact on this thesis had the recent works by Rasmussen (2002),
Stentoft (2004), Wang and Hwang (2007), Cortelezzi and Villani (2009), Golec et al.
(2010), Cuervo-Cazurra and Annique Un (2010) and Cassimon et al. (2011) which fo-
cused on solution methods to solve the real options valuation problem for R&D projects.
4.2 Least Squares Monte Carlo Algorithm
Least Squares describe an approach to approximate solutions for overdetermined or
inexactly specified systems of equations. The purpose of the least squares approach
is not to solve the equations directly but rather minimize the sum of squares of the
residuals. Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) introduce C(ω, s; t, T ) which describes the
path of cash flows which are generated by the option with ω being a sample path. This
function is conditional on the option not being excercised at or prior to point in time t
and the optionholder is following the optimal stopping strategy for all s, t < s. The least
squares are used to approximate the conditional expectation function for each point in
time recursively, tK−1, tK−2, ..., t. The induition behind that is that C(ω, s; tk, T ) can
differ from C(ω, s; tk+1, T ) since it may be optimal to stop a tk+1 and with this changing
all subsequent cash flows in a realized path. Following Longstaff and Schwartz (2001)
the value of continuation F (ω; tk) can be expressed as
F (ω; tk) = EQ
[ K∑
j=k+1
exp
(
−
∫ rj
tk
r(ω, s)ds
)
C(ω, s; tk, T )|Ftk
]
(4.1)
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) assume that the functional for Equation 4.1 can be ex-
pressed as a linear combination of measureable basis functions. These basis functions
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are a set of polynomials. The model by Schwartz (2004) which we will use as a basis for
our model does not explicitely clearify which polynomials as basis functions were used.
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) use Laguerre polynomials but also point out that others
like Legendre or Chebyshev can be used.
4.2.1 Total Cost to Completion (K)
Following Schwartz (2004) this parameter refers to the total costs of completion. In
agreement with GlaxoSmithKline we have set this parameter K at e 223 million. These
costs are defined as the total costs spend by GlaxoSmithKline within the milestone
payment. The total costs to completion will decrease over time. Since we include
following Schwartz (2004) investment uncertainty K follows a stochastic process. A
stochastic process describes compared to a discrete process that there may be an inital
starting point but with ongoing different possibilities of the process.
4.2.2 Cash Flow Rate (C)
The cash flow rate can be described as the cash flows that would be received per year if
the project which is valued would be completed . Therefore if the project is completed,
this means in our case that the research and development is completed, the cash flows
are realised. These two different cash flows can be described as anticipated cash flows
and realized cash flows. We defined for our case study a quarterly cash flow rate of
e 12.5 million. As we have described for K the cash flow rate follows also a stochastic
process by the same behaviour.
4.2.3 Maximum Investment Rate (I) and Terminal Cash Flow
Multiple (M)
Furthermore a maximum rate of investment I per year has to be defined for our case.
Following Schwartz (2004) and DiMasi (2001) the average duration of a research and
development process and therefore the investment period is 10 years and since the total
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cost to completion at the starting point for GlaxoSmithKline are e 223 million which
equals e 22.3 million of maximum investment rate. We consider in this case that the
pharmaceutical company enters the market with its new drug and is protected by patent
laws. This means that we do not consider drugs entering the market which are not
protected by patent laws. We have described in the last chapters the reasons for patent
protection. If a drug is under patent protection the cash flows for the patent holder
are decreased significantly after the expiration of the patent due to the entry of generic
drugs (Grabowski and Vernon (1992)). Schwartz (2004) included this fact in his paper
by assuming that the terminal value of the project is five times terminal cash flow rate
which equals the terminal cash flow multiple M to be 5.
4.2.4 Annual Probability of Failure (λ)
We have shown in the chapter on research and development cost estimation that there
is a certain probabilty of failure for each project during the period of investment. Fol-
lowing Schwartz and Moon (2000) such events are called catastrophic events and could
be unknown sideeffects of a drug or another company getting the patent for a certain
molecule. A Poisson probability due to Ross (2003) satisfies the conditions that the
number of successes in two disjoint time intervals is independent and the probability of
a success during a small time interval is proportional to the entire length of the time
interval. Therefore the Poisson probability with parameter λ can be used to describe
the per unit of time probability of failure since with a defined unit time of one year. At
the point in time were the project fails its value will jump to zero (Schwartz (2004)).
To run the simulaton following Schwartz (2004) further parameters have to be defined.
The time step size ∆t is described as the time whenever the option holder, in our case
GlaxoSmithKline, can abandon to exercise the option. This means that GlaxoSmithK-
line can stop the payment and the project under certain circumstances every quarter of
a year. Furthermore the time until the expiration is also taken from Schwartz (2004)
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by 20 years 1. Including the time step size this yields to a matrix with n paths (the
number of possibilities derived by the simulation) and 80 points in time leading to a
n× 80 matrix.
4.2.5 Investment Cost Uncertainty
As we have mentioned before following Schwartz (2004) that the expected cost to com-
pletion is a dynamic parameter and can be therefore described by a controlled diffusion
process2
dK = −Idt+ σ(IK) 12dz (4.2)
Since K has been defined as the total costs to completion dK equals the change in
total costs to completion. I is again the investment rate and dt the time step size per
year. Following Schwartz (2004) dz is an increment to a Gauss Wiener process3 which
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the market portfolio and σ the cost uncertainty.
The function can be described by the first term −Idt which is the control of the diffu-
sion process. This should reflect what we have said about the cost to completion. The
estimated remaining costs to completion decrease as the investment proceeds.
Pindyck (1993) described the technical uncertainty, which is in our case σ(IK)
1
2dz, as
the physical difficulty of completing the project and therefore can only be resolved by
investing in the project. This definition of Pindyck (1993) has been used by Longstaff
1This assumption by Schwartz (2004) follows the estimations by DiMasi (2001). We have shown that
the calculated value varied in the paper by DiMasi et al. (2003) but we take for our model also a 20
years of patent protection.
2Note that this controlled diffusion process is based on the work by Pindyck (1993) and following
Schwartz (2004) any other process can be used without major changes in the analysis
3Following Merton (1998) a Gaussian process is a stochastic process {Xt; t ∈ T} for which any linear
functional applied to the sample function Xt will result normally distribution. The Wiener-process
is named after Norbert Wiener. One of the most best known examples of the Wiener process is the
Brownian motion. The Wiener process is described as a continuous stochastic process W (t) for all
t ≥ 0 with W (0) = 0. The increment W (t)−W (s) is then Gaussian with a mean of 0 and variance
t− s for 0 ≤ s < t (Merton (1998)).
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and Schwartz (2001) to describe the uncertainty in their least squares approach which
is the basis for the model by Schwartz (2004). Therefore this definition is also used in
this thesis.
According to Pindyck (1993), the cost uncertainty σ, can be inferred from a simple ana-
lytical expression which relates the variance of the projects total cost and the volatility
parameter σ assuming that cost and cash flow processes are uncorrelated and the vari-
ance of cost to completion follows the following expression
V ar(K) =
σ2K2
2− σ2 (4.3)
4.2.6 Cash Flow Uncertainty
Follwing Schwartz (2004) the dynamics of the net cash flow rate can be described by a
Geometric Brownian motion:
dC = αCdt+ φCdw (4.4)
Where again dw is an increment to a Gauss Wiener process which is correlated with the
market portfolio. It may also be correlated with the uncertainty in the expected cost to
completion of the project. The parameter α is defined as the cash flow drift or in other
words the rate of inflation, whereas η is the risk premium associated with the cash flow
process and φ defines the cash flow uncertainty.
Schwartz (2004) argues that for our purposes the risk neutral or risk adjusted process
will be used
dC = (α− η)Cdt+ φCdw (4.5)
The risk premium associated with cash flow process η depends on the probability of a
successful completion of the project, β, the return of the market, rm and the risk free
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rate, r:
η = β(rm − r) (4.6)
If we define (α − η) = α∗ where α∗ as the risk adjusted drift we can reformulate the
equation as
dC = α∗Cdt+ φCdw (4.7)
As mentioned before the cash flows are received by the option holder after the investment
has been completed. The cash flows we receive in the simulations before the end of the
investement are cash flows that would be received if the investment would be completed.
4.2.7 Value of the Project
We have two possibilities, either the paths in which the investment is completed or paths
in which the investment is not completed.
Paths in which the investment is completed
For each path and discrete point in time two possible outcomes can be described. One
outcome s that the investment is completed and the other is that the investment is still
progressing. The value of the project is a function of realized cash flows and time. We
calculate following Schwartz (2004) cash flows backwards from the end of the patent
protection NT as a function of the terminal cash flow multiple and the cashflows of the
point in time. Therefore at the expiration date of the patent, the value of the project is
calculated as
W (i, NT ) = M · C(i, NT ) (4.8)
It is important to mention that this boundary condition holds if the project wasn’t
abandoned before. From this on we calculate the project value for those periods where
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the investment is completed backwards starting with W (i, NT ). The following function
is calculate until the stopping criterion is reached which is the discrete point in time
where costs of completion are larger than 0.
W (i, j) = exp(−r∆t)W (i, j + 1) + C(i, j)∆t (4.9)
In the implemented simulation this procedure is looped until the period where research
and development is not completed.
4.2.8 Paths in which the investment is not completed
For the case that the investment is not completed and an optimal abandonment is
possible, the expected value of continuation is estimated following Schwartz (2004) by
regressing the discounted value of the project W (i, j) = exp(−(r + λ)∆t)W (i, j + 1)
onto a set of basis functions at point j in time. According to Schwartz (2004) the value
received by this is the best unbiased estimator for the conditional expected value. The
rule derived from this equation says that for all those paths for which the received value
is smaller than the additional investment which has to be made in period j, the optimal
strategic choice of the option holder is to abandon and therefore the investment rate I
is set to W (i, j) = 0. For all those paths were the calculated value is larger than the
additional investment, the value of the project is calculated as
W (i, j) = W (i, j)
′ − I∆t (4.10)
This role back algorithm works by rolling back in time and searches for every discrete
point in time or decision node if the decision criteria are met. According to Schwartz
(2004) we have implemented the value of the project starting at time zero and moving
forward until the expiration of the patent.
4.3 Solution Procedure
According to Schwartz (2004) we focus in the simulation of total cost of completion
and expected cash flows not on continously points but rather on discrete points in time.
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The argument is that a real option can only by exercised at a discrete point in time.
Following Schwartz (2004) this assumption would made perfectly sense for analysing RD
projects. The equation we have described for total cost of completion and expected cash
flows have to be adapted to fullfill this assumption:
K(t+ ∆t) = K(t)− I∆t+ σ(IK) 12 (∆t) 12 1 (4.11)
C(t+ ∆t) = C(t)− exp((α∗ − 0.5φ2)∆t+ φ(∆t) 12 2) (4.12)
The parameters 1 and 2 are standard normal variates with correlation ρ. Standard
normal variates can be derived by a Z transformation and will be obtained in the sim-
ulation by 1 = x1 and 2 = ρx1 + x2
√
1− ρ2. The independent random drawings from
a standardized normal distribution x1 and x2 are generated by a random function of
MATLAB and then used to calculate 1 and 2. Moreno et al. (2001) examined the
impacts of different basis functions on option prices and came to the conclusion that it
can be not proved which basis function provide the best regression results. Schwartz
(2004) has not clearly mentioned which basis functions he uses for his implementation
of the algorithm. Schwartz (2004) mentions that he uses polynomials wth nine terms as
bass functions. According to Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) the types of basis functions
used include the Hermite, Legendre, Chebyshev, Gegenbauer and Jacobi polynmials.
We present solutions using Legendre polynomials as basis functions for our coefficients.
To compare our results generated with Legendre polynomials we used also Chebyshev
polynomials for our one-stage model.
4.4 Legendre polynomials
For our implementation we have chosen the Legendre polynomials and used them as
basis functions. The Legendre polynomials are solutions to
d
dx
[(1− x2) d
dx
Pn(x)] + n(n+ 1)Pn(x) = 0
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Figure 4.1 shows a plot in MATLAB of the first Legendre polynomials.
Figure 4.1: Legendre Polynomials
P0(x) = 1
P1(x) = x
P2(x) =
1
2
(3x2 − 1)
P3(x) =
1
2
(5x3 − 3x)
P4(x) =
1
8
(35x4 − 30x2 + 3)
P5(x) =
1
8
(63x5 − 70x3 +5 x)
The reason why we need these polynomials is that we connect the polynomials with
the cash flow variable, the total cost variable, the income and cost variable. According
to Schwartz (2004) if there are state variables, the set of basis functions should include
them. The overall function is derived by ordering the Legendre three and four polynomial
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to the cash flow variable and the five and six Legendre polynomial to the total cost
variable. The second Legendre polynomial is described as the product of income and
cost variable. Therefore we can describe the overall function as:
W ∗ = 1 + LII(C ·K) + LIII(C) + LIV (C) + LV (K) + LV I(K) (4.13)
where L is the Legendre polynomial numbered from II − V I since LI = 1.
According to Schwartz (2004) our model does not take into account to delay the in-
vestment and to restart the project when after it stopped. Therefore it only takes into
account the abandonment as mentioned previously. The argument Schwartz (2004) uses
to not consider the restart of the project in the field of research and development is that
cash flows will reduce to expiration of the patent. In our model this is included by the
fact that if the value of a project equals 0, it will stay at the value 0 until the expiration
of the patent.
4.5 Chebyshev polynomials
As mentioned we tried different polynomials for our one-stage model. In the following
we present the Chebyshev polynomials for which we will also present solutions to the
one-stage model in the forthcoming chapter. Chebyshev polynomials are used in many
parts of numerical analysis.
For an integer value of n ≥ 0 following function defines the Chebyshev polynomials
Tn(x) = cos(ncos
−1x)
with −1 ≤ x ≤ 1
Consider x = cos(θ) with 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi then Tn(x) = cos(nθ).
For n = 0
T0(x) = cos(0 · θ) = 1
n = 1
T1(x) = cos(θ) = x
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n = 2
T2(x) = cos(2θ) = 2cos
2(θ)− 1 = 2x2 − 1
After we have shown how the first three polynomials are derived we show in the
following the first five polynomials which we will use in our one-stage model:
T0(x) = 1
T1(x) = x
T2(x) = (2x
2 − 1)
T3(x) = (4x
3 − 3x)
T4(x) = (8x
4 − 8x2 + 1)
T5(x) = (16x
5 − 20x3 +5 x)
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GlaxoSmithKline and the Case
We the last section we have presented the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation and we
have described why we choose this method to evaluate the case study. Before we start
to present our input data and results the case study will be presented.
5.1 Business Profile
GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) is one of the world’s largest research-based pharmaceutical
companies that discovers, develops, manufactures and markets human health products
(GlaxoSmithKline (2011)). According to the Fortune 500 report 2010 GlaxoSmithK-
line is the fourth largest pharmaceutical company worldwide concerning total revenues.
Table 5.1 (Fortune (2011)) shows the total revenues in USD billions and the change in
percentage from 2008 to 2009.
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Table 5.1: Largest Pharmaceutical Companies 2010 (Fortune (2011))
Rank Company Total Revenues Change 09/08
1 Johnson&Johnson 61.90 -2.9
2 Pfizer 50.01 3.5
3 Roche 47.35 7.5
4 GlaxoSmithKline 45.83 16.5
5 Novartis 44.27 6.8
6 Sanofi-Aventis 41.99 6.3
7 AstraZeneca 32.81 3.8
8 Abott Laboratories 30.76 4.2
9 Merck & Co. 27.43 15.0
10 Bayer HealthCare 22.30 3.8
11 Eli Lilly 21.84 7.2
12 Bristol-Myers Squibb 18.81 6.2
It is an innovative company that produces branded products only, which it has de-
veloped itself. The company has two main divisions, pharmaceuticals and consumer
healthcare.
Figure 5.1: Logo of GlaxoSmithKline (GlaxoSmithKline (2011))
The mission statement of GlaxoSmithKline is to improve the quality of human life
by enabling people to do more, feel better and live longer (GlaxoSmithKline (2011)).
GlaxoSmithKline states that the company values can be described through:
• Respect for people
• Patient focused
• Transparency
• Integrity
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The focus of GlaxoSmithKline is to be the company in the pharmaceutical industry
with the highest ethical standards and corporate responsibility principles (GlaxoSmithK-
line (2011)). Due to this (GlaxoSmithKline (2011)) defines three key aspects which have
to hold for their R&D:
• GlaxoSmithKline may explore and apply new technologies and will constructively
engage stakeholders on any concerns that may arise.
• GlaxoSmithKline will ensure that our products are subject to rigorous scientific
evaluation and testing for safety, effectiveness and quality
• GlaxoSmithKline will comply with or exceed all regulations and legal standards
applicable to the research and development of our products
Figure 5.2: Statement of GlaxoSmithKline (GlaxoSmithKline (2011))
The consumer healthcare businesses of GSK consist of over-the-counter (OTC) medicines,
oral care products, such as the toothpaste brands Aquafresh, Macleans and Sensodyne,
and nutritional healthcare drinks (GlaxoSmithKline (2011)). The pharmaceuticals di-
vision is the largest part of GlaxoSmithKline’s businesses and can be divided into pre-
scription drugs and vaccines. The headquarters of GSK are located in the UK, with
additional operational headquarters in the USA. This report deals with the pharmaceu-
ticals division only.
GlaxoSmithKline conducts R&D at more than 20 sites and employs 15,000 employees
in R&D (GlaxoSmithKline (2011)). The principal facilities are located in UK, USA,
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Japan, Italy and Belgium, and minor R&D sites are located in Canada, France and
Spain. All R&D for vaccines is carried out in Belgium. GSK is involved in many differ-
ent R&D partnerships with academic institutions, biotechnology companies and other
pharmaceutical companies. The company has a leading position in genetics and in new
drug discovery technologies.
GlaxoSmithKline employs 44,000 people in sales and has the largest sales force in the
pharmaceutical industry (GlaxoSmithKline (2011)). It has various co-marketing and
co-promotion agreements with other pharmaceutical companies. GlaxoSmithKline is a
leader in the four therapeutic areas mentioned above and in vaccines. Worldwide, it had
a market share of over 20% for respiratory treatments, a share of approximately 13%
for antiinfectives and close to 10% of central nervous system drugs (GlaxoSmithKline
(2011)).
Following the Annual Report 2010 GlaxoSmithKline has global pharmaceutical sales of
over 22 billion pound and also the largest share in several therapeutic areas, including
the vaccine and over-the-counter products (OTC).
5.1.1 Strategic Focus
In the Annual Report 2010 GlaxoSmithKline formulated three strategic priorities for the
future:
• Grow a diversified global business - Diversification of business to create a more
balanced product portfolio and move away from a reliance on traditional markets
is a strategic focus of GlaxoSmithKline. Therefore GlaxoSmithKline invests in
emerging markets like Japan, in products like vaccines and consumer healthcare
business.
• Deliver more products of value - The aim of GlaxoSmithKline is to sustain
an industry-leading pipeline of products, ensuring that they demonstrate value
for healthcare providers. The R&D strategy of GlaxoSmithKline is built around
focusing on the best science, diversifying through externalisation of research, and
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improving the returns on investment.
• Simplify the operating model - GSK is a large and complex organisation. A
transformation of the operating model to assure a reduction of complexity leading
to improve efficiency and reduce costs is also a strategic focus of GSK.
• Concerning sustainability GlaxoSmithKline is strongly committed to social and en-
vironmental responsibility - this fact is reflected in R&D, the production processes
and the products.
5.2 The Case
1 In the pharmaceutical industry, it is a common practice, that pharmaceutical com-
panies integrate biotech companies by mergers & acquisition to gain a higher innova-
tive capability. As already mentioned, GlaxoSmithKline pursues also another strategy.
The company participates in biotech companies by milestone payments. The follow-
ing overview of the press releases from 2008 to 2010 concerning cooperation between
Austrian biotech companies and GlaxoSmithKline tries to illustrate the approach of
GlaxoSmithKline.
In October 2008, GSK Biological and AFFiRiS concluded the highest endowed contract
in the Austrian biotech industry until then (AFFiRiS (2011)). In fact, GSK Biological
paid up to e 430 millions plus royalties for exclusive licensing rights to AFFiRiS. AF-
FiRiS GmbH produces vaccines against Alzheimer’s, atherosclerosis and other diseases
with urgent medical needs. The company possesses several patents and has its domi-
cile in Vienna. Subject of the contract between GSK and AFFiRiS are several vaccines
against Alzheimer’s. Two of the vaccines are already in the clinical phase I.
GSK pays e 22.5 millions up-front, further payments will be paid with the progress of
the vaccine development (AFFiRiS (2011)).
1The informations in this section rely mostly on interviews with the management of GlaxoSmithKline
Austria.
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In 2009, GSK and Amgen resolved a cooperation in which the companies will share
the commercialization of Amgen’s monoclonal antibody denosumab. The drug prevents
and treats different bone diseases (osteoporosis, bone metastases, bone density due to
Cancer therapy and bone erosion due to rheumatoid arthritis). The intention of this co-
operation is assure a global and rapid availableness of the drug once it is allowed in the
different countries. While Amgen commercializes the American and European market,
GSK will register and distribute denosumab in countries in which Amgen does not have
a commercial presence.
Amgen, which is the biggest biotech company in the world, is convinced that the sup-
ply in cooperation with GSK is far more effective, than if they would do it on their
own (Amgen (2011)). In financial terms, the agreement between the GSK and Amgen,
schedules an initial payment and further commercial milestone payments to Amgen in
the amount of e 120 million, as well as the payment of ongoing royalties (Amgen (2011)).
In December 2009, GSK Biologicals and Intercell formed a strategic alliance to develop
and commercialise innovative needle-free patch-based vaccines (Intercell (2009)). The
agreement will include Intercell’s candidate vaccine for travellers’ diarrhoea (Phase III)
and an investigational single application pandemic influenza vaccine (Phase II), as well
as other potential future patch vaccines. In terms of the agreement, GSK will make an
up-front cash contribution of e 33.6 million, in addition to an equity investment of up to
e 84 million through a staggered shareholding purchase option of up to 5% in Intercell
(Intercell (2009)).
In February 2010, GSK announced another cooperation with an Austrian biotech com-
pany, Apeiron Biologics AG. GlaxoSmithKline paid e 12.5 million up-front and mile-
stone payments amounting to e 236 million were arranged (Apeiron (2010)). In return,
GSK obtained the exclusive rights on the project ’APN01’. APN01 (recombinant human
angiotensin converting enzyme 2) is a biopharmaceutical against the acute respiratory
distress syndrome and is currently in the phase I development(Apeiron (2010)).

5.2 The Case
The cooperations with AFFiRiS, Intercell and Apeiron are just three of 15 global coop-
erations with biotech companies that were concluded in the last years (GlaxoSmithKline
(2011)). Just these three deals comprehend payments of e 783.6 million - e 70 million
were paid up-front. In October 2009 AFFiRiS received the first milestone payment in
the amount of e 10 millions after the successful completion of the phase I.
According to Evelyn Scho¨dl, General Manager of GSK Austria, one of the main goals of
GSK is to grow a diversified global business. For this reason, they do not want to rely
only on their own R&D department, but they seek cooperation with external partners
in science. These technology transfer agreements benefit GSK by giving them access to
new markets. Accordingly, the central business development team is searching world-
wide for talent, ideas, technologies and new drugs away from their own research.
Together with GlaxoSmithKline Austria and Apeiron we focused in this thesis on the
case of their milestone agreement and tried to implement a project evaluation model
based on their agreement.
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Results
This chapter is divided into two sections: the first sections describes the conclusions
made by several interviews with management of GlaxoSmithKline and analysts from
the BAWAG P.S.K. The second section shows the computational results derived from
the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation. In the conclusion chapter we will compare
the computational results with the findings of the qualitative research.
We made several interviews with the management of GlaxoSmithKline, Apeiron and
analysts from BAWAG P.S.K. We especially want to point out the interviews with Dr.
Ronald Pichler, External Affairs Director GSK Austria, and Dr. Edwin Glassner, Ana-
lyst at the Risk Analytics&Modelling Department at BAWAG P.S.K. These interviews
had a deep impact on this thesis since the need for a a R&D project valuation method
was pointed out by the management of GlaxoSmithKline Austria.
After conducting several interviews concerning the milestone agreement fo GlaxoSmithK-
line with Apeiron we focused on specifying parameters with the help of the parameters
defined in Schwartz (2004) and the results by DiMasi (2001); DiMasi et al. (2003). We
have described in the Introduction how this thesis developed from the qualitative ap-
proach to implementing and interpreting the quantitative modell. After we have shown
the results for the one-stage model and the extension to a multi-stage model we will
integrate again in the conclusion our qualitative results.
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6.1 Computational Results
Before we discuss the results derived by the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation we
summarize the parameters we used. In discussion with GlaxoSmithKline Austria some
parameters were changed in comparison to Schwartz (2004) to better fit the case.
Table 6.1: Parameters Used in the Simulation
Parameters Value
Total Cost to Completion e 223 million
Maximum Investment Rate e 25 million per year
Cost Uncertainty 0.5
Cash Flow Rate e 50 million per year
Cash Flow Uncertainty 0.35
Cash Flow Drift 0.02
Terminal Cash Flow Multiple 5
Annual Probability of Failure 0.1
Time to Expiration of the Patent 20 years1
Correlation between Costs and Cash Flows -0.1
Risk Premium Associated with Cash Flows 0.036
Risk-free Rate of Interest 0.05
Time Step Size in Simulations 0.25 year
Number of Simulations 60000
The Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation was implemented in MATLAB. All experi-
ments were conducted on a AMD Phenom(tm) II X4 955 processor with 3.2 GHz. In
the following we want to present a convergence analysis and a computational time for
the different number of paths2.
2For our computational experiments the random seeds number is chosen as 0.

6.1 Computational Results
6.1.1 Computational Time
For the computational time we see that it is steadily increasing with an end value
of 944.04 seconds or 15.73 minutes for our case study number of paths 60.000. We
approximated a function fitting the computational time received from the experiments
with
F (x) = 2.44× 10−7x2 (6.1)
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Figure 6.1: Computational Time
Both the approximation function and the function received by our computation ex-
periments are plotted in Figure. A computational time of 15.73 minutes can be seen as
not too long by considering that the result is two 60000×80 matrizes for both the cost to
completion and the expected cash flows needed for the calculation of the projects value.
As we will see in the convergence analysis already a sample of 35000 paths delivers us
very good results with a deviation of 2 % of the result received by a simulation with

6 Results
60000 paths. The computational time reduces in the case of 35000 paths to 3.64 minutes,
therefore considering this computational time a practical use of this model can be seen.
6.1.2 Convergence Analysis
Before we will go into further detail we present a convergence analysis. We calculated
the project value for 1000-60000 paths for the random seed number of 0 and compared
it to the final project value which is calculated by
PV =
∑4
i=0 PVi
n
∀i = 0, ..., 4 (6.2)
where PVi is the project value for each random seed number from 0 to 4 and n is the
total number of random seeds.
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Figure 6.2: Convergence Analysis
The convergence analysis shows that by increasing the number of paths the calculated
project value converges around the calculated final project value. This apparent trend
of convergence shows that the assumptions we made in front were correct and that the
final project value is validated3.
3For further remarks see the convergence proof by Schwartz (2004).
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6.2 Project Value Results
In the last section we have presented the convergence analysis which examined the
convergence of different number of paths for the random seed number zero concerning
the total project value. As we have shown in the last section the overall project value is
derived as PV =
∑4
i=0 PVi
n
. The seed of random numbers is implemented by the MATLAB
function randn(’state’,j) which returns normally distributed random numbers for each
j state. The results are presented in Table 6.2 with a path number for each seed number:
Table 6.2: Project Value for the Single-Stage Model
Seed of Random Numbers 0 1 2 3 4
Project Value (million e) 92.6876 90.2786 94.2085 87.5583 90.0434
The average out of these project values is then e 90.95528 million which is our final
value of the project.
6.2.1 Cost to Completion and Cash Flow Analysis
Figure 6.3 shows a for a random sample of 50 paths the total cost of completion for
each path. According to Figure 6.3 the total cost to completion decrease over time. Due
to the generation of 50000 paths the total cost to completion start as described at the
defined costs with a certain deviation which can be seen in Figure 6.3.
Our sample of 50 paths reflects the fact mentioned by Pindyck (1993) that the total
cost of completion decrease with development and technical uncertainty processing. In
Figure 6.4 we have plotted the behaviour concerning the expected cash flows for the
50 randomly chosen paths. The cash flow rate lies for most of these 50 sample paths
between e 2 to 10 million per quarter.
For Figure 6.5 we have randomly select one path out of the 60.000 paths simulated and
plotted cost to completion and cashflows per quarter. Until the research and development
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Figure 6.3: Total Cost to Completion
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Figure 6.4: Expected Cash Flows
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and therefore the investment is finished which can be seen in Figure 6.5 that the cost
to completion are zero, the cash flows are anticipated. After approximately 4 years the
investment is completed and the cash flows start. These cash flows are now realized
cash flows and are plotted until the expiration of the patent after 20 years. Following
Grabowski and Vernon (1994) the cash flows reduce dramatically after the expiration
of the patent due to generic drugs entering the market. It would be far more complex
to forecast future realized cash flows after the expiration of the patent since we have
to estimate the probability of generic drugs entering the market, the new price and the
number of competitors.
Furthermore we have described in the chapter on drug cost estimation that there are
certain conditions when patent protection is increased by several years. We would have
to consider also this possibility in our forecast. Therefore we focus in our case only on
the patent protected time.
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6.2.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In the following section a sensitivity analysis concerning some parameters will be pre-
sented. We want to examine the effects of a change in our parameters which helps us to
control if our programm works accurately. Due to computational reasons the number of
paths for this sensitivity analysis was reduced to 35000 paths.
The first sensitivity analysis concerns the cash flow uncertainty. For our case study we
have set the cash flow uncertainty parameter to 0.35. Figure 6.6 shows what happens
if we use different cash flow uncertainty parameters. By increasing the cash flow uncer-
tainty parameter the project value increases. This result follows Schwartz (2004) with
the reason that cash flow uncertainty increases the probability of good outcomes. On
the other hand it also increases the probability of bad outcomes and by definition of the
model also increases the probability of abandonment.
In other words this means that if the cash flow uncertainty is high the value of the project
gets higher due to the option to abandon the project. We will see that by increasing the
cost uncertainty the project value also increases, but the effects behave opposite. The
result in our sensitivity analysis was that by increasing the cash flow uncertainty the
percentage of paths which were abandoned, increased.
To understand why the project value increases consider an example: research and de-
velopment would be finished after ten years but after two years costs are higher than
expected cash flows. If the option holder has no possibility to stop the investment, he
would loose a lot of money. Therefore the option where he has the possibility to abandon
has a higher project value due to cost savings.
Before we examine different parameters for cost uncertainty we examine the correlation
between costs and cash flows. The value of the project increases the higher the correlation
between costs and cash flows gets. The reasoning for this is that a negative correlation
implies that either costs are low and cash flows are high or costs are high and cash
flows are low. This means that the received values are wider distributed. It is clear
that a positive correlation corresponds to a higher probability that the project will be
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Figure 6.6: Sensitivity Analysis Cash Flow Uncertainty
abandoned. We considered in our sensitivity analysis for the correlation between costs
and cash flows negative correlations from -0.15 to -0.05 and a correlation of 0 which
means that there is actually no correlation. According to Figure 6.7 a clear trend can be
seen: The closer the correlation gets to positive values the project value decreases due
to the arguments presented before. It is clear that by increasig the cost uncertainty the
value of the project increases. The probability of abandonment decreases with increasing
the cost uncertainty. The assumption hereby is that according to Schwartz (2004) there
is a higher learn effect by investing with more uncertainty. This is also shown by Figure
6.8. Varying the cost uncertainty between 0.3 and 0.6 leads to an increase in the project
value from e 70.7227 to e 100.1114 million.
By increasing the expected costs to completion the project value decreases. As in the
sensitivity analysis before we keep all other parameters constant and just increase the
expected cost to completion from e 180 million to our case study costs of e 223 million.
The project value decreases then from 151.51 to 90.71 which can be seen in figure 6.9.
According to our analysis shown in Figure 6.10 increasing the maximum rate of in-
vestment leads to an increase in project value. An increase in the maximum rate of
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investment per year leads to an earlier finish of the research and development phase
which then leads to a longer time of realized cash flows increasing the value of the
project.
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The next sensitivity analysis is done concerning the expiration of the patent. We have
assumed according to Schwartz (2004) that the patent expires after 20 years. We have
now run the simulation with a patent expiration of 18, 20, 22 and 24 years. Clearly
as shown in Figure 6.11 the project value increases with the years of expiration of the
patent increase.
Since the time for realized cash flows increases with an increase in expiration of the
patent the value of the project increases keeping all other parameters constant.
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Figure 6.11: Sensitivity Analysis: Expiration of Patent
6.2.3 Project Value Results for Chebyshev Polynomials
The presented results were derived with the assumptions of Legendre polynomials as
basis functions. In the following we want to compare the results derived to results we
generated with Chebyshev polynomials as basis functions.
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Table 6.3: Project Values with Chebyshev polynomials as basis functions
Seed of Random Numbers 0 1 2 3 4
Project Value (million e) 93.6102 90.7578 95.1899 88.3298 91.3333
The average calculated out of the project values of seed numbers is e 91.8442 million.
We see that compared to the average project value calculated with Legendre polynomials
as basis function the difference is e 0.88892 million. Figure 6.12 shows the difference for
seed numbers 0, 1, 2, 3, 4.
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Figure 6.12: Comparison: Legendre and Chebyshev Polynomials
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Chapter 7
Multi-stage Extension
We have presented results and sensitivity analysis for our case study based on the single-
stage model by Schwartz (2004). Schwartz (2004) argued that there is a logically ex-
tension to his model to a multi-stage model. We have shown in the chapter on cost
estimation of pharmaceuticals that there are different costs for every different phase of
the research and development process. We therefore try in this chapter to extent this
model to a multi-stage model which includes different probabilities of failure for each
phase and different costs for each phase. The extension of the one-stage model was pro-
posed by Schwartz (2004) and we tried to implement his extension fitting our case. For
each phase, the expected costs are calculated seperately in MATLAB, therefore changing
the equation for the dynamics of expected costs to
dKj = −Ijdt+ σj
√
IjKjdzj (7.1)
We change in this thesis several parameters in comparions to single-stage process:
1. Expected costs for all different phases, Kj
2. Expected time for all different phases Tj
3. Maximum investment rate for all different phases Ij
4. Probabilities of failure for all different phases λj
All other parameters which we have defined before remain constant for all phases.
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7.1 New defined parameters
7.1.1 Total Cost to Completion (Kj)
In accordance with GlaxoSmithKline we agreed on a total costs to completion for each
stage which together sum up to the total costs we used in the one-stage simulation of
e 223 million1. Table 7.1 shows the different costs for each stage:
Table 7.1: Cost to Completion per Phase
Stage Phase I Phase II Phase III Authorization
Costs to Completion 25 45 123 30
As discussed in the chapter on cost estimation in pharmaceutical research and devel-
opment, the costs in phase III are due to the complexity of the stage far the highest.
This complexity mostly arises by the large sample of patients needed for the different
stages.
7.1.2 Expected Time to Completion (Tj)
We considered hereby the expected time to completion following Schwartz (2004) with
10 years to make our results between one-stage and multi-stage simulation compara-
ble. This follows also the work by DiMasi (2001), Vernon (2005) and DiMasi et al.
(2003) with certain variations in the time to completion around 10 years. Together with
GlaxoSmithKline Austria we divided this total expected time of completion between the
different stages. These completion times are shown in Table 7.2:
Again we assume Phase III to have the longest time to completion and Phase I the
shortest according to DiMasi et al. (2003).
1Note that these are approximative costs and are used to test the multi-stage simulaton. Improvements
shall be made for all input parameters in the future. The purpose of this thesis is to see if the
simulation works and delivers good results.
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Table 7.2: Time To Completion per Phase
Stage Phase I Phase II Phase III Authorization
Time to Completion 1.5 2.5 4 2
7.1.3 Maximum Investment Rate (Ij)
After we have defined the total cost to completion and the expected time to completion,
the maximum investment rate can be calculated. The maximum investment rate is
calculated by dividing the total cost to completion by the expected time to completion
Kj
Tj
∀j = 1, ..., 4
Table 7.3 presents the maximum investment rates for each phase.
Table 7.3: Maximum Investment Rate per Phase
Stage Phase I Phase II Phase III Authorization
Time to Completion 16.6 18 30.75 15
7.1.4 Probability of Failure (λj)
The probability of failure is calculated by using the proposed formula from Schwartz
(2004).
e−λTj = 1−R (7.2)
As discussed in the previous sections λ follows a Poisson probability function and de-
scribes the probability of failure. R is the rate of catastrophic events according to
Schwartz (2004), but notice that (1−R) is not the real success rate since the a success
rate has to includes failures due to catastrophic events but also the optimal excercise of
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the abandonment option (Schwartz, 2004). We assumed that this rate in the single-stage
simulation with 0.5, which is a reasonable assumption as we will see by calculating the
overall probability out of each stage probabilities. Table 7.4 shows the rates (1−R) for
all different phases:
Table 7.4: (1−R) per Phase
Stage Phase I Phase II Phase III Authorization
(1-R) 0.8 0.75 0.85 0.9
By taking the product of the (1 − R) probabilities for each phase which equals 0.47
we see that a rate of 0.5 was a good approximation by Schwartz (2004) for the one-stage
model. With these assumed input factors we can calculate the probability of failure, λ.
Reformulating equation 7.2 leads to
λ = − ln(1−R)
Tj
(7.3)
If we solve this new equation for all phases by including their different completion
times Tj and the rates this leads us to the probabilities of failure presented in Table 7.5:
Table 7.5: Probability of Failure per Phase
Stage Phase I Phase II Phase III Authorization
λ 0.14 0.11 0.04 0.05
Before the results are presented in the next section and compared to the single-stage
simulation, the other parameters used in the multi-stage simulation are presented. Note
that these parameters have not changed to the single-stage simulation so the results are
still compareable.
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Table 7.6: Parameters Used in the Simulation
Parameters Value
Cost Uncertainty 0.5
Cash Flow Rate e 50 million per year
Cash Flow Uncertainty 0.35
Cash Flow Drift 0.02
Terminal Cash Flow Multiple 5
Time to Expiration of the Patent 20 years
Correlation between Costs and Cash Flows -0.1
Risk Premium Associated with Cash Flows 0.036
Risk-free Rate of Interest 0.05
Time Step Size in Simulations 0.25 year
Number of Simulations 60000
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7.2 Results
The Least Squares Monte Carlo multi-stage simulation was implemented in MATLAB
and all experiments were conducted on a AMD Phenom(tm) II X4 955 processor with 3.2
GHz. In the following we present a generated sample path and the results and running
time for different seeds of random numbers. As shown in the Table 7.6 the number of
paths simulated was chosen due to comparability reasons to the single-stage model at
60.000 paths.
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Figure 7.1: Sample Path for the multi-stage model
Compared to the sample path in the single-stage model the total cost to completion
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vary over time since we defined different costs for the different stage2. We see from
Figure 7.1 that approximately between 4 and 8 years is an increase in costs which is
directly linked to Phase III of the R&D process. The investment is completed in period
41 which equals approximately 10 years. At point 0 in time assumed cash flows are
around e 9 million. At the expiration of the patent the cash flows equal approximately
e 0.8 million. Table 7.7 shows the calculated project values for diferent seed of random
numbers and the running time in minutes. The average and therefore the final project
value was calculated as e 91.00492 million.
Table 7.7: Project Values per Phase
Seed of Random Numbers 0 1 2 3 4
Project Value (million e) 92.4008 90.1053 93.5402 87.6363 91.342
Running Time (min) 29.98 15.72 15.70 29.02 15.67
As the last part of this chapter we want to compare the results from the multi-stage
model with the results from the single-stage model. As described in this chapter we
changed the input parameters but its furth mentioning that the sum of the total cost of
completion stay constant as well as the overall probability of failure did not change.
Table 7.8: Comparison PV Single-stage/Multi-stage
Seed of Random Numbers 0 1 2 3 4
Multi-stage model (million e) 92.4008 90.1053 93.5402 87.6363 91.342
Single-stage model (million e) 92.6876 90.2786 94.2085 87.5583 90.0434
Difference (total) -0.2868 -0.6233 -0.6683 0.078 0.9386
We see from Table 7.8 that there is a certain difference between the project values
2Please note again that Figure 7.1 shows a randomly selected path and therefore might not represent
a typical path
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received from the single-stage model and the multi-stage model but it proves also that
the assumption by Schwartz (2004) is reasonable that a single-stage model is a good
approximation for the problem with a much lower running time. The overall average
of the single-stage model was calculated with e 90.955 million and the average of the
multi-stage model as mentioned with e 91.004 million.
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Conclusion
Investments on research and development in pharmaceutical companies are character-
ized by a high level of future uncertainty. In this thesis, we discussed the case of Glax-
oSmithKline and Apeiron and tried to value the project with real option techniques. In
the following we want to present the structure of our research and discuss problems and
possible extensions to this thesis.
After we have defined the topic of this thesis, several interviews with GlaxoSmithKline,
Apeiron and financial analysts were conducted. We came to the conclusion that there is
a need for a new project valuaton technique and we agreed on implementing the Least
Squares Monte Carlo simulation by Schwartz (2004). As presented in the chapter on
our single-stage model which follows the model by Schwartz (2004) the different R&D
phases were summarized as one stage. We discussed the results from the single-stage
model again with GlaxoSmithKline and Apeiron and made some adjustments.
Schwartz (2004) proposed an extension to a multi-stage model in the Appendix but did
not implemented it. We tried to extend our model following the proposed extension by
Schwartz (2004) and implemented it in MATLAB. We came to the result that the single-
stage model by Schwartz (2004) delivers very good results in acceptable computational
time whereas the multistage model allows us to vary the parameters as for example the
probability of failure for each phase.
For our case we assumed that the product of all probabilities of failure have to be equiv-
alent to the probability of failure for the single-stage model. Therefore the difference
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between both models concerning the final project value was rather small.
The Least Squares Monte-Carlo (LSM) models delivers different results from the stan-
dard net present value (NPV) analysis since it includes (managerial) flexibility allowing
the model to stop the research process or in other words to abandon the option. The
NPV analysis is widely used in practice but does not included those flexibilities. There-
fore it mostly underestimates projects and yields to negative results.
For our case we also found out that the LSM model is superior to the Binomial Tree
Model in R&D project valuation because the LSM model considers more uncertainties
and therefore captures more features of real world R&D projects.
As the section on computational time showed the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation
approach as an extension by Schwartz (2004) delivers good results in acceptable com-
putational time. We have to consider that this model can be just used to value R&D
projects without competitive interactions. To some extend we tried to model compet-
itive interactions by the probability of failure term which per definition included also
the probability that another company entered the market with a similar product be-
fore research and development of the project was completed. Further research should be
done in the future on including game theoretic concepts into the real options framework.
Some research on the field of investment decisions in a real option and game theoretical
framework has been done in the past years. We want to point out Krychowski and
Que´lin (2010) with a focus on pharmaceutical R&D and a A Strategic R&D Investment
with Flexible Development Time in Real Option Game Analysis by Villani (2009).
Another limitation of our multi-stage approach is that the model can only be used in
situations in which the duration of the cash flows depends on the duration of the whole
project. In this situation only options to abandon are considered.
There are some improvements which we propose to implement in further research. We
have compared Chebyshev and Legendre polynomials as basis functions but the robust-
ness of the model concerning the basis functions should be tested on a broader variety
of polynomials.
Furthermore the LSM model still can be extended to improve accuracy of the implemen-
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tation. Cash flows from drug sales start very low at the introduction of a new drug, then
grow to a maximum close to the expiration of the patent, and decrease substantially once
the patent has expired (Grabowski and Vernon (1994)). In the future this assumptions
should be taken into account.
The problem we face is that it is very difficult to forecast future sales after the expira-
tion of the patent. During the duration of the patent we assume a monopoly situation
therefore we only have to estimate the potential and the need of the product on the mar-
ket and define a certain expected cash flows and a cash flow uncertainty. If we would
now consider competition we would have to estimate the degree of competition and the
resulting market share which has a direct impact on the sales and cash flows.
The last thing to mention is that we have implemented our model in MATLAB. The
reason why we have chosen MATLAB over other programmes and languages is that
MATLAB is a numerical computing environment which delivers (concerning our ma-
trix manipulations and calculations) very good results and the implementation is in our
opinion a lot faster compared to C++ for example. Nevertheless future research should
try to implement the model using other languages as C++ which will have definitely a
high effect on running time and probably on the quality of the results.
Summarizing, in this thesis we present two possible project evaluation models based on a
real options approach. We implemented the single-stage model by Schwartz (2004) and
also the proposed multi-stage extension and adapted the models to fit the case of Glax-
oSmithKline and Apeiron. The obtained results show that the real options approach
and in particular the Least Squares Monte Carlo simulation should be consulted as a
decision making tool for project evaluation by companies in the future.
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Abstract
The main objective of this work is to formulate, implement and evaluate a pharmaceu-
tical investment following the real options approach. After a presentation of different
models the Least-Squares Monte Carlo model by Schwartz (2004) is presented and im-
plemented. The input data for the model is based on the case of a milestone payments
agreement between GlaxoSmithKline and the biotech company Apeiron. The data was
collected and validated through interviews with the management of GlaxoSmithKline
and Apeiron. After the implementation of the single-stage model, the results were again
discussed with GlaxoSmithKline and Apeiron and the objectives for an extension of the
model were set. The extended model considers the research and development phases as
separate stages with different cost structures and probabilities of failure.
This thesis is structured as follows: After the introduction the second chapter gives
an overview of the real options theory, starting with general characteristics of financial
options. The third chapter provides an overview of the structure of the pharmaceuti-
cal research and development process and discusses various methods for estimating cost
and duration. The fourth chapter describes the Monte Carlo simulation in general and
develops the Least Squares Monte-Carlo model for the single-stage process. In addition,
explanations as to why the Least-Squares Monte Carlo approach was chosen over other
approaches and why it generates better results than the standard net present value anal-
ysis are presented.
Before the results of the single-stage model are presented in chapter six, the milestone
payments agreement between GlaxoSmithKline and Apeiron is presented in chapter five.
In chapter six the results of the single-stage model for the milestone payments agreement
between GlaxoSmithKline and Apeiron are presented and discussed in terms of conver-
gence and sensitivity analysis. Furthermore as in chapter seven, the implementation of
various basis functions such as Legendre or Chebyshev polynomials is discussed.
Lastly, in chapter seven the extension of the model of Schwartz (2004) in a multi-stage
model is introduced and the achieved results are compared with the results obtained
from the single-stage model in chapter six.
The results, which are achieved by both the single-stage and the multi-stage model,
display an improvement on net present value analysis if the underlying data is suitable.


Zusammenfassung
Diese Arbeit hat als Hauptziel ein Bewertungsmodell fu¨r eine pharmazeutischen Investi-
tion nach dem Ansatz der Realoptionen zu formulieren und zu implementieren. Nach
einer Diskussion verschiedener Bewertungsmodelle wird eine Least-Squares Monte Carlo
Simulation nach Schwartz (2004) vorgestellt und implementiert. Als Fallstudie dient
die erfolgsbedingte Kooperation zwischen dem Pharmaunternehmen GlaxoSmithKline
und dem Biotechunternehmen Apeiron. Die Daten wurden durch Interviews mit dem
Management von GlaxoSmithKline und Apeiron erhoben und ausgewertet. Nach der
Implementierung des einstufigen Modells wurden die Ergebnisse erstellt und mit Glax-
oSmithKline und Apeiron besprochen. In der Folge wurden die Ziele fu¨r ein erweitertes
Bewertungssystems festgelegt. Dieses erweiterte Modell betrachtet die Forschungs- und
Entwicklungsphasen als getrennte Stufen. Es bildet daher die unterschiedlichen Kosten-
strukturen und Ausfallswahrscheinlichkeiten zwischen den Phasen realistischer ab.
Diese Magisterarbeit ist wie folgt aufgebaut: Nach der Einleitung gibt das zweite Kapitel
einen U¨berblick u¨ber die Realoptionen Theorie beginnend mit allgemeinen Charakteris-
tika von Finanzoptionen. Das dritte Kapitel gibt einen U¨berblick u¨ber die Struktur des
pharmazeutischen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsprozesses und diskutiert verschiedene
Methoden zur Scha¨tzung von Kosten und Dauer. Das vierte Kapitel beschreibt die
Monte Carlo-Simulation im Allgemeinen und entwickelt das Least Squares Monte-Carlo
Modell fu¨r den einstufigen Prozess. Daru¨ber hinaus wird erla¨utert warum der Least-
Squares Monte Carlo Ansatz gewa¨hlt wurde und dass dieser zu verla¨sslicheren Ergeb-
nissen als die Net-Present Value Analyse fu¨hrt.
In Kapitel fu¨nf wird die Kooperation zwischen GlaxoSmithKline und Apeiron vorgestellt.
Als Basis fu¨r dieses Kapitel dienten vor allem Interviews mit dem Management von Glax-
oSmithKline Austria und Apeiron. In Kapitel sechs werden die Ergebnisse des einstufi-
gen Modells fu¨r die erfolgsbedingte Kooperation zwischen GlaxoSmithKline und Apeiron
dargelegt und anhand von Konvergenz- und Sensitivita¨tsanalysen diskutiert. Des Weit-
eren wird die Implementierung von verschiedenen Basisfunktionen wie Legendre oder
Chebyshev Polynom ero¨rtert. In Kapitel sieben wird die Erweiterung des Modells von
Schwartz (2004) in ein mehrstufiges Modell vorgestellt.Die Resultate aus dem mehrstu-
figen Modell werden mit den Ergebnissen des einstufigen Modells verglichen.
Die Ergebnisse, welche sowohl durch das einstufige als auch durch das mehrstufige Model
erreicht werden, stellen bei entsprechender Datenlage in jedem Fall eine Verbesserung
zur ga¨ngigen Net-Present Value Analyse dar.
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